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ABSTRACT

The costs of in-house IC fabrication have increased significantly with new technology
nodes and nanoscale transistors. Many companies have outsourced their need for IC
fabrication to eliminate the overhead costs associated with operating a fabrication facility.
While outsourcing has its benefits, it provides opportunities for hardware Trojan (HT)
injection at different design levels. Hardware Trojans and IP piracy are the new realities
that must be considered for trustworthy IC design. The miniature size of HTs, coupled
with their diversity and unpredictable effects, makes them difficult to detect. Even though
various solutions and design methods have been proposed to address security concerns
posed by HTs, a comprehensive solution is yet far from reach. Moreover, the effects of
Process, Voltage, and Temperature (PVT) variations have been largely neglected in the
reported solutions which may undermine their effectiveness. This dissertation presents
Hardware Trojan prevention techniques that are resilient to PVT variations.
In this dissertation, two new Design-For-Security (DFS) solutions for HT prevention
using a layout filling technique and a layout manipulation method are presented. The
first DFS technique involves occupying the unused polysilicon layer with minimum
feature wires to deprive attackers of the resources needed for Trojan routing. This
technique prevents attackers from inserting an active layer on the silicon
vi

substrate. Since the active layer connects to the polysilicon layer directly, if the unused
poly layer is covered with minimum size wires, it becomes impossible for an attacker to
rout a HT without removing a portion of the polysilicon wires. A readout circuit is used
to ensure that the layer is intact and has not been tampered with. This technique can
provide a complete utilization of the unused areas of the polysilicon layer.
A novel tamper resilient solution is also presented as the second DFS technique to
capture integrated circuits' electromagnetic (EM) signature. In this method, the remaining
metal and polysilicon layers are utilized as internal magnetic probes to monitor the
device's signature and, in the meantime, deprive attackers of layout resources to route
HTs. 3D full-wave EM field simulations using High-Frequency Structural Simulator
(HFSS) show that tampering with a chip to insert a Trojan of 12 μm2, the area required to
insert an inverter, can be detected through the magnetic signature. Some unique HTs
native to 3D ICs, such as HTs inserted during “Die Stacking” and “TSV Bonding” stages,
can also be detected using this technique.
A solution utilizing memristor technology is also presented in this dissertation to
implement a configurable layout to obfuscate the design. The main design is divided into
sub-circuits and forwarded to a fabrication foundry, but the interconnects between those
are not revealed to the foundry. The sub-circuits are connected through configurable
memristor switches after fabrication. In the proposed solution, split manufacturing is not
needed, and an untrusted foundry can fabricate the circuit without compromising its
security. Moreover, the proposed technique provides direct access to the sub-circuits
through a network of configurable switches. This will increase the observability and
controllability at the test phase and help detect and isolate possible Trojans.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Integrated Circuit (IC) design involves several stages, including simulation, layout
generation, fabrication, packaging, and testing. Semiconductor companies could handle
all of these steps in-house in the early days. As the semiconductor technology evolved, so
did the costs of new fabrication nodes. Meanwhile, as the competition between
companies intensified, the design to market time became a significant factor in the
success or failure of electronic products. As a result, many companies started outsourcing
their IC fabrication to overseas foundries to meet the market challenges [1]. The
outsourcing lowered the fabrication costs considerably, allowing companies to devote
their resources to research and development. While outsourcing has many benefits, it
comes with drawbacks. Aside from the technical knowledge that impairs and fades over
time, the security of electronic products can be undermined due to outsourcing. Foundries
can modify IC designs by adding extra circuits to reveal sensitive information stored on
chips. The hardware circuits added to ICs to alter their functionalities are called
Hardware Trojan (HT). In general terms, Hardware Trojan (HT) can be defined as any
malicious modification of the original circuit to alter its characteristics that may lead to
failure, leakage of confidential information, shortage of the expected lifetime, denial of
service under certain conditions or, in general, any undesirable effect on ICs.
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Figure 1.1. Minimum feature size scaling trend for Intel logic technologies [2].

The CMOS technology scaling has slowed down, as shown in Fig. 1.1, due to many
technical challenges. 3D IC technologies have emerged as viable solutions to keep up
with the demand to add more functionalities to a single chip. The introduction of 3D ICs
has reduced the vulnerability against conventional HT attacks and introduced new threats
[3], [4]. A 3D IC is usually fabricated by stacking different 2D layers together. The
stacked dies are bonded using through-silicon vias (TSVs). 3D ICs have some advantages
over 2D chips, such as 1) a 3D IC can be fabricated using split manufacturing by
distributing the routing of a single circuit across different dies; 2) modified versions of
conventional 2D IC security solutions can be added to different dies to enhance the
security of each die [3]. The stacking process of a 3D IC conceals the circuit design
details, making reverse engineering challenging [5].
2

Moreover, the stacked structure of a 3D IC makes it easier to obtain active layers from
different foundries. On the other hand, the noise in 3D ICs is commonly higher than the
conventional 2D counterparts, which can mask the effects of HTs. Furthermore, the
limited access to the internal layers of a 3D IC makes it even harder to detect HTs once
the IC is fabricated.
The threat of HTs has drawn more attention after discovering counterfeit chips
destined for safety and security-critical systems such as high-speed train breaks, hostile
radar tracking in F-16 fighters, and ballistic missile defense control systems and Falcon
5000 nuclear identification tool during recent years [6]. These alarming security concerns
about the vulnerability of ICs to HTs have resulted in preventive measures such as the
Trust in ICs initiated in US by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
[7] and the Holistic Approaches for Integrity of ICT (Information and Communication
Technologies) – Systems (HINT) project [8] originated in Europe.
Modern electronic devices, such as RFID tags, IoT (Internet of Things) devices, home
appliances, or even biomedical equipment, can be vulnerable to security threats [10-12] if
Hardware Trojans infect them. If an attacker gets the complete knowledge of a circuit,
he/she can design Hardware Trojans with small footprints that can be easily obscured
[13]. The insertion of a HT can compromise the reliability and functionality of an IC or
a system [14–16]. Trojans not only can leak critical information or secret keys stored in a
chip, but they also can jeopardize its functionality.

3

Figure 1.2. Generalized concept of a Hardware Trojan [9].

1.1. HARDWARE TROJAN
The operation of a generic hardware Trojan is illustrated in Fig. 1.2. A Trojan
observes a group of selected internal nodes known as triggering nodes, indicated by N1 to
Nn in Fig. 1.2. The status of trigger nodes is used to activate the Trojan under rare
circumstances. The trigger is selected from a set of nodes whose combination of desired
outputs creates a rare condition. A Trojan can be composed of a combinatorial circuit
reacting to particular trigger events. It could also contain several sequential elements
forming a finite state machine in which a sequence of transitions has to be traversed
before triggering the Trojan. Finally, after the triggering conditions are satisfied, the
Trojans payload is delivered to unleash malicious activities that affect one or several
nodes depending on the Trojan design.
A

Hardware Trojan Taxonomy
Tehranipoor and Koushanfar in [16] explained a detailed hardware Trojans' taxonomy

to
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Figure 1.3. Detailed taxonomy showing physical, location, activation, and action characteristics of Trojans
(Inspired from [16]).

characteristics. This taxonomy enables researchers to examine their countermeasures
against different types of Trojans. The tree diagram shown in Fig. 1.3 has been inspired
by the classification presented in [16]. A new classification category is introduced based
on Trojans' location characteristics to simplify the Trojan taxonomy further. Also, the
branches of Activation characteristics have been rearranged to reflect the classification
properties accurately. As stated in [16], Trojans can be hybrids if they can have more
than one activation characteristic. Nevertheless, this taxonomy highlights Trojans' main
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Figure 1.4. A typical design flow of IC manufacturing process [9].

characteristics and is useful for defining and evaluating the capabilities of detection and
prevention strategies.
B

Hardware Trojan Design
Figure 1.4 illustrates a typical design flow of IC manufacturing process along with the

potential threats in each step. A Trojan can be inserted at any stage of an IC development
process from Register Transfer Level (RTL) to fabrication. Assuming trusted ComputerAided Design (CAD) tools, third-party intellectual property (IP) cores, and untampered
design files, our study's primary focus will be on tackling Trojans embedded in the
physical design after tape-out and during fabrication.
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Figure 1.5. Classification of Hardware Trojan Design [3].

The design process of a hardware Trojan can be classified into four categories, as
shown in Fig. 1.5 [3]. The trigger and payload mechanisms determine Trojan detection's
difficulty, which led researchers to explore and evaluate novel triggers and payloads. On
the other hand, the circuitry added by a Trojan can be used to develop a detection
mechanism utilizing side channel effects like additional power consumption and
variations of radiation, timing, and delay. Design optimization has become a part of a
Trojan design to minimize the impact of the Trojan on the main circuit and avoid
detection. A benchmark for different types of Trojans and trust test vectors has been
developed online at www.Trust-hub.org to facilitate the comparison of different detection
and prevention techniques.

1.2. HARDWARE SECURITY METHODS
Hardware Trojans can be inserted to perform any or all of the following tasks (a)
faulty operation or modification of the main function, (b) electrical modification, and (c)
reliability reduction [17]. In addition to the security threats, Trojans added to the main
circuit in the fabrication process can also induce economic losses related to IC
production. To address the problem of hardware Trojan insertion at various IC design
flow stages, researchers have adopted different solutions to target different types of
7

Trojans. These solutions can be divided into two major groups, namely Hardware Trojan
Detection and Hardware Trojan Prevention.
A. Hardware Trojan Detection
The design flow of the main circuit is not hampered while detecting Hardware
Trojans. In all detection methods, the IC is tested for possible insertion of HTs after
fabrication. At a broad level, hardware Trojan detection can be divided into three
categories [16] of (a) logic testing, (b) side-channel analysis, and (c) reverse engineering.
In the logic testing method, test vectors are applied during the test phase. The test
patterns are generated to perform structural tests and detect stuck-at faults [18, 19]. Test
patterns used for HT detection may not excite well-designed hardware Trojans, and they
may remain undetected. The restricted observability and controllability limit the potential
to detect Trojans in this method. Moreover, a small alteration of the HT trigger can deny
the test scheme to pinpoint a HT [20].
Side-channel analysis, such as analyzing round key operations at different cycles of
AES encryption, or observing transient current or electromagnetic spectrum, can be used
to detect Hardware Trojan [21–27]. This technique is non-invasive, as it does not tamper
with the original circuit. This method can be used successfully to extract security-critical
information, such as cryptography keys from ICs. Side-channel analysis commonly
requires a trusted golden circuit to compare the results with the Circuit Under Test
(CUT), which is proven difficult to obtain [3]. Most of the reported approaches [14–27]
that require a golden IC, rely on invasive methods that are costly and time-consuming.
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Moreover, new fabrication nodes' low supply voltage requirement acts as a detrimental
factor for HT detection, as the Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR) is lower compared to
previous fabrication nodes. As a result, the background noise and even process variations
can mask Trojan activities and prevent detection through side-channel analysis [13].
Another critical point to consider is the delay of logic gates highly affected by the supply
voltage variations. The propagation delay of logic gates also increases as the voltage drop
increases. Besides, other parameters like channel length (L), channel width (W) of
transistors, the thickness of oxide (TOX), the threshold voltage (Vth), process, temperature,
and environmental variations can also affect the propagation delay of fabricated gates and
library cells [28]. These variables make HT detection using side-channel analysis very
difficult. A Design for Hardware Trust (DfHT) technique has been presented in [29] to
increase the percentage variation caused by a HT compared to the original circuit to
overcome the conventional limitations of the side-channel analysis. A segment of the
circuit is activated, while the other segments are kept inactive to reduce the total circuit
switching activity. This solution increases both the Trojan-to-circuit Switching Activity
(TSA) and the power consumption ratio between the main circuit and the Trojan
circuitry. The authors of [30] have presented another DfHT technique using an optically
active protective TiO2-Ti-TiO2 layer stack with an angular dependent reflectivity as a
chip backside. The light reflected off the chip backside has a strong angle-dependent
reflectivity, which alters if the backside is tampered with by an attacker. This method has
the potential to determine whether an attack took place or not by creating a pattern of
photocurrents during the IC running state.
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The reverse engineering method, presented in [31], is a powerful HT detection method
compared to other conventional techniques, but it is costly and a destructive approach.
Moreover, reverse engineering may fail, as healthy ICs may get selected for reverse
engineering in situations where a small portion of fabricated ICs is infected.
With the advancements in big data analysis, researchers have developed newer
methods to detect HTs, such as Visual Inspection and Machine Learning. Visual
inspection [32, 33] is based on the idea of observing the top-level metal layer and
comparing it with the original layout. However, non-destructive visual inspection
methods cannot account for HTs designed on low metal layers. Machine learning [34]
and isolation-based hardware techniques [35, 36] have also been utilized to detect HTs in
IP cores used as building blocks for 3D ICs.
Third-party IP (3PIP) cores add an extra layer of complexity to the problem of Trojan
detection. Cores from a third party can be divided into three main categories: (a) soft, (b)
firm, and (c) hard [37]. Soft cores are the ones that are designed using hardware
description language such as Verilog/VHDL. A firm core is characterized by specific
libraries provided by fabrication foundries. Firm cores can be used to optimize the area
through placement and routing. Researchers have proposed different ideas in [37–40] as
countermeasures for HTs inserted into 3PIP cores. Hardware Trojan detection in 3PIP
cores is difficult as codes or libraries or GDSII files provided by third-party designers
may include Hardware Trojans. If a core is infected with a Trojan code, all fabricated ICs
will be infected.
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Most of the available Trojan detection methods are dedicated to detecting a specific
HT type and focusing on a particular parameter variation. This shortcoming can lead to
undetected Trojans. Moreover, the effect of noise and process, voltage, and temperature
(PVT) variations are usually ignored during the detection process, even though these
factors can mask the effects of a HT. The numerous possible ways of Trojan insertion
combined with their unique triggering systems make it very difficult to detect Hardware
Trojans. As a result, a comprehensive solution to detect all types of Trojans is yet far
from reach. Moreover, once a Trojan is inserted, the damage is done, and even if it is
detected, there is no way other than discarding the infected device. On the other hand,
trojan prevention methods have the advantage of protecting ICs in the first place.
B. Hardware Trojan Prevention
The limitations and complexities of HT detection methods have motivated IC
designers to modify design flow to enable HT prevention. Researchers have developed
various Design-for-hardware-trust (DfHT) techniques to facilitate HT prevention and
support better detection at the same time. These methods are commonly used to detect
HTs through differences between the characteristics of a Trojan free IC and an infected
one. The methodologies for HT prevention can be classified as (a) logic obfuscation, (b)
compact GDS-II layout generation, and (c) layout filling [41].
As the name suggests, in the logic obfuscation method, the functionality of ICs [17,
42–51] is obscured. A logic obfuscation method has been introduced in [42], where
reconfigurable circuits are added to the main design to prevent foundries from
determining the circuit's functionality and protect it against reverse engineering. A split
manufacturing flow has been introduced to obfuscate the circuit in [43]. This method can
11

be employed for both 2.5D and 3D IC protection. However, it cannot prevent Hardware
Trojan insertion during the die stacking process and TSV bonding in 3D ICs.
Chakraborty and Bhunia [44] introduced netlist-level obfuscation, where the gate-level
netlist of a pre-synthesized IP core is modified and then resynthesized to support
functional and structural obfuscation with a low design overhead. In [45] and [46],
different state-obfuscation methods are presented, where the circuit is obfuscated with a
security key. An interesting idea is presented in [47] using dummy contact-based IC
camouflaging, where the functionality of a circuit is masked using dummy contacts. As a
result, the same cell layout can represent different gates, depending on where dummy
contacts are placed. A DfHT technique is presented in [17] using new design techniques
and new memory technologies to detect various HTs in both testing and in-field
operations. This technique can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during the synthesis,
place and route, and IC fabrication stages. The idea presented in [48] uses gates with
different doping concentrations to vary the threshold voltage and create thresholddependent camouflaged cells. Attackers can use various approaches to determine
camouflaged gates' identities, such as measuring the etch rate to find heavily doped
transistors and profiling the difference in power and delay characteristics of camouflaged
gates [48]. Logic Locking [49], [50] also have been classified as obfuscation
methodologies. Researchers in [51] have summarized all the latest obfuscation methods
with their pros and cons.
A compact GDS-II layout has been generated in [52] by adding dummy flip-flops
(FFs). Even though this idea was the building block for various new layout filling
approaches, it has disadvantages as removing dummy-FFs can not be detected since they
12
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Figure 1.6. Taxonomy of measures against hardware Trojans. (inspired by [3]).

do not perform a function. Thus, dummy FFs can be replaced with HTs by attackers. A
more efficient method is the layout filling approach described in [53], where unused
spaces in the layout have been filled with functional cells. However, this method only is
capable of filling approximately 90% of the existing layout. Another HT prevention
method using layout filling approach, called Built-In Self Authentication (BISA), has
been proposed in [54]. Standard library cells, along with Test Pattern Generator (TPG)
and Output Response Analyzer (ORA), are used in [54] to fill the unused area. Another
technique for filling empty spaces using functional cells is introduced in [55], where both
shift registers and functional cells are substituted with Multiple Input Shift Registers
(MISRs) and Output Response Analyzers (ORAs). These methods are somewhat
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vulnerable to Trojan insertion as they cannot fill 100% of the unused die area. The
possibility of using functional cells to fill the unused die area also depends on the initial
occupation ratio [53]. If the original circuit occupies more than 85% of the die, these
methods cannot prevent HT insertion [53]. Moreover, the performance parameters
degrade with increasing circuit-complexity.
The classification of measures against hardware Trojans is depicted in Fig. 1.6,
inspired by [3]. Another sub-category, delay, has been added as a separate detection
method using side-channel analysis as delay-detection methods have gained a lot of
interest. The Split Manufacturing for Trust [3] has been more correctly categorized as a
sub-level of Camouflage techniques used to prevent HT insertion. Split manufacturing is
a technique in which a trusted foundry completes a portion of the circuit fabrication
process to camouflage the circuit functionality.
The introduction of 3D ICs has provided attackers with various new methods to insert
HTs in ICs [4], [5]. 3D ICs are more vulnerable to HT attack as multiple dies from
different foundries are incorporated into a single IC, some of which can come from
untrusted foundries. Researchers have proposed some ideas to take advantage of the split
manufacturing method [42, 56 – 58] to increase the security of 3D ICs. The idea is to
obfuscate the 3D IC design by lifting some key components of the complete design to a
single layer and fabricate it in a local trusted foundry. The other layers can be fabricated
by any foundries regardless of the trust issue. Even though this method can eliminate
most HT insertion threats, it still suffers from HT insertion opportunities unique to 3D
manufacturing. The integration of multiple layers requires intermediate levels like die
stacking and TSV bonding, where a HT can be inserted. Moreover, TSVs can be
14
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Figure 1.7. A typical CMOS process indicating layout layers: (a) 3D view (b) Top view [59].

exploited during the intermediate steps. One of the main characteristics of a 3D IC that is
working against HT detection is its inherent thermal issues and elevated temperature in
the middle layers, which can be manipulated as a trigger for a Trojan [60].

1.3. HARDWARE TROJAN PREVENTION USING LAYOUT FILLING METHOD
An effective method to prevent hardware Trojan insertion is layout manipulation. It
can be done either by filling the unused chip area using components such as gates,
routing lines, and various functional circuits and by manipulating the layout of the
original design by adding redundancies. As mentioned above, the main drawbacks of
layout filling method are the increased power consumption and the fact that the entire
unused space cannot be occupied using functional cells. Two separate approaches are
presented to overcome these shortcomings in this dissertation. In the first method, the
polysilicon space is covered using minimum feature wires, and in the second one, the
whole die is concealed using minimum feature polysilicon and metal wires. A third
approach is also presented, where the original design is manipulated by rerouting the
15

critical nodes of the design through an array of Memristor devices. Even though this is a
type of obfuscation method, it can also be considered a layout manipulation method.
A. Filling Only Unused Polysilicon Layer with Polysilicon Wires
Polysilicon layers connect directly to the active region of an IC, as is shown in Fig.
1.7. Hence, if the entire unused polysilicon layer is covered with minimum feature wires,
it will prevent attackers from inserting gates or functional cells to implement a Trojan. To
insert a Trojan, in this case, a portion of the polysilicon wire has to be removed. A
readout circuit can detect such temper with the polysilicon layer, and hence the Trojan
can be detected. It has been shown that this method can detect the insertion of a minimum
size library cell. Chapter 2 represents an article depicting this method published in a
conference proceeding.
To further improve the prevention method's effectiveness, the polysilicon wires have
been placed as probes to capture the original circuit's signature. If a portion of the
polysilicon wires is removed or if the wire is replaced by a capacitor, the signature will
be different even if the readout circuit does not reflect any change. Chapter 3 presents a
journal article published by Elsevier, explaining the complete method as an extension of
the method presented in Chapter 3.
B. Filling Entire Unused Space of the Die with Polysilicon and Metal Wires
The approach mentioned above can account for a hardware Trojan insertion that
requires an active/substrate layer. However, it cannot prevent attackers from using metal
wires to modify the original circuit's functionality. The unused area of the die has been
covered using both polysilicon and metal wires of minimum feature, as shown in Fig. 1.8.
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Figure 1.8. (a) Routing of a typical digital-to-analog circuit in HFSS environment. (b) Unused layers used
as magnetic probes. [61].

It has also been demonstrated that this technique can also be used effectively for 3D ICs.
The main advantage of this method for 3D ICs is that it cannot detect Trojans inserted
during Die Stacking and TSV bonding stages of 3D IC fabrication, which are not
protected by conventional security methods. A detailed analysis of this method is
published in an IEEE transaction, presented in Chapter 4.
C. HT Prevention by Layout Manipulation Using Memristor Devices
Memristors (a contraction of memory resistors) were first hypothesized by Leon Chua
in 1971 [62] as the fourth fundamental circuit element. A memristive device is a two17

(a)

(b)

Figure 1.9. Crossing nanowires are separated by memristor switches at the junctions that can be electrically
configured. Nanowire crossbars are connected to a CMOS chip via metallic pins over the CMOS stack [9].

terminal electrical element that acts as a variable resistive switch. Its resistance depends
on the magnitude, duration, and polarity of the voltage applied to it. Memristive devices
can retain the state of recent internal resistance based on the history of the applied voltage
or charge, even without a bias. One of the popular structures implemented using
memristors is the crossbar architecture [63], shown in Fig. 1.9 (a). The crossbar structure
has two layers, each of which boasts of an array of parallel nanowire electrodes. These
two layers together form a grid of orthogonal nanowires. In a memristor-based crossbar
structure, a cross-point junction is formed by a memristor switch connecting the top layer
to the bottom layer, where two nanowires cross over each other, which is shown in Fig.
18

1.9 (b). The proposed scheme's basic idea is to obfuscate the circuit's functional behavior
by selecting a specific number of connected net pairs from the netlist and rerouting them
across a configurable grid of nanowire crossbars. This can be done by connecting one net
of each pair to a source contact and the other net to a drain contact along the two metallic
pin rails connecting the crossbar to the CMOS stack as shown in Fig. 1.9. The memristors
of Fig. 1.9 connect each horizontal line to all vertical lines. In the final design, the
vertical line and the horizontal line connections are established based on the voltage
applied to the memristors through vias, where memristors act like an open or closed
switch depending on the applied voltage.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 contains a conference
publication on Trojan prevention using polysilicon wires, published in Design &
Technology of Integrated Systems In Nanoscale Era (DTIS), 2019; Chapter 3 features a
journal on Trojan prevention by layout filling method using both polysilicon and metal
wires, published in IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility in 2020;
Chapter 4 shows the content of a journal on Trojan prevention by layout filling method
using only polysilicon wires, which is undergoing the second review in Elsevier Journal
of Microelectronics Reliability; Chapter 5 presents a journal on Trojan prevention
inspired by obfuscation technique using the crossbar structure of memristor devices,
which has been submitted to a journal. Finally, the layout manipulation method along
with the three separate approaches, are discussed with possible future works in the
conclusion in Chapter 6.
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2.1

INTRODUCTION

Hardware security is becoming a major concern for IC designers. RFID tags, IoT
(Internet of Things) devices, home appliances or even biomedical equipment and any
other electronic device can be vulnerable to a security threat [1-3] if it infected with a
Hardware Trojan (HT). HT is an intentional circuit modification to alter the functionality
of the original design, or to leak valuable information. Trojans can be added to the main
circuit during the fabrication process, which in addition to a security threat, can induce an
economic loss related to IC production. HTs can be inserted into the original circuit to
perform any or all the following three tasks (a) faulty operation or modification of the
main function, (b) electrical modification, and (c) reliability reduction [4].
Many solutions have been proposed in the literature [4 – 11] to address the security
threats posed by HTs through Hardware Trojan detection. HT detection techniques can
be classified into three different categories [5]: (a) logic testing, (b) side-channel analysis
and (c) reverse engineering. In the logic testing method, the circuit is inspected using
some known IC test methodologies [6, 7]. However, a Trojan can remain undetected in
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this method as the test vectors applied to the IC in the test phase may not be able to
activate the Trojan. Moreover, the test infrastructures may be denied the possibility to
detect an HT insertion via a minute alteration of the HT trigger [8]. The side channel
analysis method [9, 10] is a non-invasive method which exploits physical parameters of
the circuit such as radiation, current, power, and so on to detect HTs. This method is
successfully used to extract critical information such as cryptography keys from
integrated circuits systems. It can also be utilized to detect Trojan activities. This method
commonly requires a trusted golden circuit for result comparison. As the latest IC
technologies work at the lower supply voltages, the Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (SNR) of these
ICs is lower compared to previous technologies. Therefore, the background noise and
even process variations can mask Trojan activities and prevent them from detection
through side channel analysis. The reverse engineering method [11] is a powerful HT
detection method compared to the other techniques; however, it is a costly and
destructive approach. Moreover, when a small portion of the fabricated ICs is infected,
reverse engineering may fail as healthy ICs may get selected for reverse engineering. In a
nutshell, Hardware Trojan detection is a difficult task in nature due to the wide range of
possible Trojans. Most of the detection methods are developed for certain classes of
Trojans and a comprehensive solution to detect all Trojans is yet far from reach.
Moreover, once a Trojan is inserted the damage is done and even if it is detected, the
infected device needs to be discarded. Trojan prevention methods, on the other hand,
have the advantage of protecting the integrated circuit in the first place.
HT prevention approaches are divided into three groups [12]: (a) logic obfuscation, (b)
compact GDS-II layout generation and (c) layout filling. In [13], researchers have added
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reconfigurable circuits to the main design to protect the circuit against reverse
engineering. Another method is proposed in [14] where the authors introduced a secureby-construction split manufacturing flow to obfuscate the netlist. Although this security
measure can be utilized for 2.5D or 3D IC protection, it cannot prevent Trojan insertion
during the die stacking and TSV bonding stages. Logic locking and IC camouflaging can
also be considered as obfuscation techniques. All the latest obfuscation methods with
their pros and cons have been summarized in [15] by some researchers. The researchers
have presented a method in [16] to create the layout as dense as possible by filling the
empty spaces in a layout by functional cells. This is an effective method but can occupy
only around 90% of the total chip. In [17], researchers have added dummy flip-flops
(FFs) as a prevention technique of Hardware Trojans. The main concern with this method
is that the detection of the removal of those dummy-FFs is not practical, and hence the
system will suffer from the possibility of HT insertion, nevertheless. Another HT
prevention method named built-in self-authentication (BISA) is presented in [18], in
which standard library cells have been added to the main circuit to fill empty areas by
using a test pattern generator and output response analyzer. In [19], the authors proposed
a solution to solve these issues by adding shift registers and functional cells instead of
Multiple Input Shift Registers (MISRs) and Output Response Analyzers (ORAs) to fill
empty spaces of the circuit and to create some combinational functions. However, the
occupation ratio in this method is around 90%, which gives attackers a chance to insert
malicious circuits. All these layout filling methods also depend on the initial occupation
ratio. The maximum initial occupation ratio reported in these papers is 85%. If the
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Figure 2.1. A typical CMOS process indicating layout layers. (a) Cross section. (b) Top view [21].

original circuit occupies more than 85% of the die, these methods cannot be used to
prevent HT insertion.
This paper presents a new HT prevention technique in which the attackers are
deprived of any space to route their malicious circuits. As compared to the prevention
methods relying on filling the silicon area, the proposed method in this work is much
easier to implement, consumes no power and supports the full occupation regardless of
the initial occupation ratio. In the proposed method, after the main circuit design, the path
to the active layer is blocked by covering the empty spaces with polysilicon. As
polysilicon connects to the active layer directly without the need of any contact, to add an
extra component to the circuit, a portion of the poly layer must be removed. Such an
alteration can be detected by the implemented readout circuit, inspired by the DelayDetection-Module (DDM) proposed in [20].
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Figure 2.2. 3D full wave simulation results indicating the electric field difference between (a) the original
and (b) the Trojan affected design.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the proposed method is covered in detail
in section II; the readout circuit is discussed in section III; section IV presents the
simulation results; and finally, section V summarizes the concluding remarks.

2.2

PROPOSED METHOD

As part of the fabrication process for CMOS technologies, the metal layers are
connected through contacts to the active silicon layer for the purposes of routing. If
unauthorized connections to the active layer are prevented, then the attackers are
deprived of the resources to insert functional Trojans. The polysilicon layer, which is
separated by a thin oxide layer as shown in Fig. 2.1, can be utilized to cover the silicon
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substrate region, where the active regions are formed. Integrated circuits are designed
using different active regions routed through polysilicon and metal layers. As shown in
Fig. 2.1 (b), the polysilicon connects directly to the active region, whereas the metal
layers need contacts to connect them to the active region. Thus, if the empty space of the
die is completely covered with a polysilicon layer, attackers will not be able to access the
substrate layer to insert malicious circuits or hardware Trojans. The partial removal
affects the electric field and alters the path delay and the overall parasitic capacitance of
the polysilicon layer which can be detected by an on-chip readout circuit. To evaluate the
effect of polysilicon removal on the distribution of the electric field and the path delay, a
conceptual IC was designed using HFSS (High-Frequency Structure Simulator). 3D full
wave simulation results in Fig. 2.2 shows the distribution of the electric field before and
after removal of a small portion of the polysilicon layer accounting for less than 1% of
the total polysilicon area. The change in the electric field is due to the variation of the
polysilicon layer’s parasitic capacitance and path resistance. The relationship between the
electric field and the parasitic capacitance of the polysilicon layer can be determined
from the stored energy as follows:
𝑛

1
1
𝑊1 = 𝐶𝑝1 𝑉 2 = ∑ 𝜀𝐸𝑖2 𝑑𝑣
2
2

(1)

𝑖=1

(1)
where W is the energy stored, CP is the parasitic capacitance, V is the applied voltage and
Ei is the electric field of discrete points in the device and v is the volume of between the
(1)
ground plane and the polysilicon layer. Removal of less than 1% of the total polysilicon
(1)
area affects the electric field distribution considerably as shown in Fig. 2.2.
Consequently, the stored energy after the polysilicon removal changes to:

(1)
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(a)

(b)
Figure 2.3. (a) Conventional Delay Locked Loop, (b) Readout Circuit.
𝑛

1
1
𝑊2 = 𝐶𝑝2 𝑉 2 = ∑ 𝜀𝐸𝑗2 𝑑𝑣
2
2

(2)

𝑗=1

(2)
Since V and ε are constants, from (1) and (2) we can write:
∆𝐶𝑝 ∝ ∆𝐸 2

(2)
(3)

(2)
where ∆𝐶𝑝 = 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 and ∆𝐸 2 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐸𝑖2 − ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝐸𝑗2 . The variation in the time
constant of the polysilicon layer can be determined from τ=R∆Cp, where 𝑅 is the total
(2)
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resistance of the polysilicon layer. Even though ΔCp can be realized using a capacitor, the
time constant will not remain the same due to the variation in resistance, and hence, the
delay will change. Circuit level simulations indicate that the parasitic capacitance
variations can readily be detected by observing the path delay. The readout circuit shown
in Fig. 2.3 is used to measure the path delay and detect possible alterations to inset
Trojans. The poly area was divided into 8 segments to ensure that the area of each
segment is small enough to detect a minor area removal. The number of segments
depends on the minimum detectable size of a Trojan. As the number of segments
increases, the smaller size Trojans can be detected.

2.3
A

READOUT CIRCUIT
Description of the Readout Circuit
The readout circuit includes a Delay Locked Loop (DLL) for time measurement. The

main advantage of utilizing a DLL for time measurement is its robustness against
Process, Voltage, and Temperature (PVT) variations. It is shown in the simulation section
that for a ±5% process variation, the propagation delay changes by less than ±1%. A
conventional DLL includes a Phase Frequency Detector (PFD), Charge Pump (CP), Low
Pass Filter (LPF) and delay-line modules, as shown in Fig. 2.3 (a). The DLL adjusts the
propagation delay of its delay-line to reduce the time difference between the signals
applied to the PFD. In the locked state, the signals applied to the PDF are aligned and
ideally, the time difference between them becomes zero.
A DLL based readout circuit is designed to measure propagation delay with a high
resolution. The block diagram of the readout circuit is shown in Fig. 2.3 (b). A Circuit36

Under-Test (CUT) is added to the DLL feedback loop to measure the delay difference
between its signal paths. The readout circuit also includes two delay-lines used to amplify
the time difference captured by the DLL.
When the DLL in the readout circuit captures the lock, the rising edges at the PFD
input are aligned as shown in Fig. 2.3 (b). Since the same clock signal is applied to both
D1 and D2 cells, we can write:
𝑇𝐷1 + 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ_1 = 𝑇𝐷2 + 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ_2

(4)

𝑇𝐷1 − 𝑇𝐷2 = 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2 − 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ1 = ∆𝑇

(5)

and therefore, we have:

where TD1 and TD2 are the propagation delay of D1 and D2 cells respectively and Tpath1
and Tpath2 represent the path-1 and path-2 propagation delays in the circuit-under-test.
From equation (5) it can be concluded that the delay difference between the two paths
of CUT is replicated by the delay difference between D1 and D2 cells. This delay is then
amplified using the technique proposed in [22]. The two delay lines of Delay-Line-1 and
Delay-Line-2 in the readout circuit are used to amplify the delay difference between the
CUT paths. The first delay line is composed of D1 cells while the second one is built
using D2 cells. Therefore, the delay difference between the outputs of the two delay lines
marked as Out1 and Out2 in Fig. 2.3 (b), becomes N∆T. This delay amplification relaxes
the design requirement for the time-to-digital converter (TDC) and enables the TDC to
measure the delay difference between the CUT paths a with a high-resolution
measurement. The operation detail of the readout circuit is presented in [20].
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Figure 2.4. Circuit-Under-Test.

To test the propagation delay of the polysilicon layer, the CUT in the readout circuit in
Fig. 2.3 (b) is designed as shown in Fig. 2.4. The propagation delay caused by the
polysilicon layer is represented by a delay cell in Fig. 2.4. The circuit also incorporates a
self-test path to test and ensure that the readout circuit has not been tampered with. The
polysilicon layer can be divided into several separate segments to increase the
measurement resolution. In this case, each segment is selected separately to measure its
nominal propagation delay. There are two modes of operation for the readout circuit, the
“Self-Test Mode” and the “Run Mode”.
B

Working Principle of the Readout Circuit
A clock signal is fed to the input of the readout circuit in Fig. 2.3 (b). The CUT, in this

case, represents the circuit shown in Fig. 2.4. In the run mode, the polysilicon layer in the
CUT introduces a delay to the signal path-2. As explained in section 3A, the DLL
feedback system compensates for the delay to acquires the lock. Once the lock is
captured, we have:
𝑇𝐷1 − 𝑇𝐷2 = ∆𝑇 = 𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦 + 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡
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(6)

Figure 2.5. The IC with Polysilicon and Readout Circuit added.

where TPoly is the propagation delay contributed by the polysilicon layer. Since the offset
delay of the readout circuit is determined in the self-test mode, the propagation delay due
to the polysilicon layer can readily be calculated and delay variations from the nominal
values can be identified.

2.4

SIMULATION RESULTS

To validate the proposed method, the readout circuit was implemented in the Cadence
environment where the polysilicon layer was used to cover the unused silicon area to
ensure that it will not be utilized for Trojan insertion. The red area in Fig. 2.5 shows the
polysilicon layer which is divided into 8 segments. After filling out the empty spaces
with polysilicon, the readout circuit was tested in the self-test-mode to determine the
offset delay. To perform the self-test, initially, the control voltage, VCNT, of the VCDL
was kept at 0 V. The input and output signals of the readout circuit at the locked state,
with the control voltage set to zero, are shown in Fig. 2.6 (a). Fig. 2.6 (b) shows the
locked condition with VCNT settling at 953.8 mV. The initial delay between the input and
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Figure 2.6. (a) The Locked Signal (b) Control Voltage of the DLL and (c) Delay between the Output and
the Input Signals.

output signals is 17.85 ps, as indicated in Fig. 2.6 (c). As the control voltage increases
from 0 to 1.8 V, the delay rises linearly from 17.85 ps to 66.43 ps, shown in Fig. 2.7. The
minimum area required for a Trojan insertion depends on the type of Trojan and the size
of the gate. An inverter from the standard cell library of 0.18µm CMOS technology,
shown in Fig. 2.8 (a), was added to the circuit to see if the proposed method can detect a
small hardware manipulation. The minimum area of the polysilicon layer that must be
removed to place this gate is around 14.85 μm2, as shown in Fig 2.8 (b). Figure 2.8 (c)
presents the delay associated with the polysilicon of Fig 2.8 (b) which is about 4.65 ps.
The implemented readout circuit can readily detect such a small delay.
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Figure 2.7. Relationship between VCDL Delay and Control Voltage.
Delay due to addition of polysilicon
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Figure 2.8. (a) Typical TSMC Inverter (b) Minimum poly needed to be removed to place that inverter (c)
Delay caused by that poly.

To simulate the effect of Trojan insertion, a portion of the poly routing was removed,
which is shown by a small circle in Fig. 2.9. Then transient simulations were performed
to find the delay associated with each routing path of the original design of Fig. 2.5. As
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Figure 2.9. The IC with polysilicon layer partially removed to insert Trojan.

\
Figure 2.10. Time delay and variation.

shown in Fig. 2.10 (a), the delay of the routing segment 2 is 90.26 ps. Later the same
simulation was performed with the layout of Fig. 2.9 to see the effect of poly removal. As
can be seen in Fig. 2.10 (b) such a poly layer removal decreases the path delay by 9.25
ps.
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Figure 2.11. Delay variation due to change in (a) Temperature, (b) Length and (c) Width.
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TABLE 2.1. TDC OUTPUT SHOWING LINEAR RELATION WITH DELAY
Seg.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Delay
(pS)
86.38
90.26
94.15
90.20
86.34
93.98
90.58
86.23

TDC Output
D9
D8
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

D7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The output of the TDC is shown in table 2.1 for different routing paths. The result
shows that each path has an almost similar delay. As seen from the table, the TDC can
detect a delay variation of about 4 ps.
Simulations were also performed to see the effects of temperature and process
variations on the path delay. Effects of the temperature variations are shown in Fig. 2.11
(a). The simulation result shows a path delay variation of less than ±1 % when the
temperature is varied from –50º C to 100º C. The length and the width of the polysilicon
was also varied by ±5%. The corresponding outputs, shown in Fig. 2.11 (b) and (c),
indicate a variation of less than ±1% in each case. These are expected results due to the
internal feedback of the employed DLL. The DLL adjusts its path delays due to its
internal feedback to capture the lock regardless of the temperature and process variations.
The feedback system in the readout circuit makes the overall measurement module
resilient against temperature fluctuations and process variations.
Table 2.2 shows the comparison of the proposed method with the reported techniques
in the literature. As seen from the table, only the poly layer needs to be filled using the
proposed technique, which can cover 100% of the available empty space, regardless of
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TABLE 2.2. COMPARISON WITH CURRENT METHODS.
Method

Maximum Initial
Occupation Ratio

Final Occupation

Paper [16]

Maximum 85%

>90%

Paper [18]

Dependent, but not
reported

93%-99%

Paper [19]

Maximum 80%

99%-100%

Proposed

Independent

100%
(poly)

Dependency on the IC
HT Detection
Size
Dependent, but not
reported
Does not work well for
bigger ICs
Cannot fill 100%
complex circuits
Independent of IC size

Hard
Hard
Hard
Relatively Easier

the initial occupation ratio. Other reported methods depend upon the initial occupation
ratio to determine what percentage of the empty spaces can be populated. In those
techniques, different cells, preferably FFs, are used to cover the empty space which limits
the occupation of the empty spaces. With the proposed method, as the poly layer is fully
occupied, no cell can be inserted without removing a portion of the poly. Moreover, the
removal of even a small portion of the polysilicon layer to insert a Trojan can easily be
detected.

2.5

CONCLUSION

As the use of outside foundry becomes more popular, the threat of hardware security
increases. As a preventative measure against malicious insertion of Trojans a new and
easy to implement solution is presented in this paper. The proposed method uses the
polysilicon layer to cover the empty spaces of the die to block the use of these spaces by
attackers. As a result, attackers will not have access to the resources to implement and
route the Trojan circuits. A DLL based readout circuit is presented to measure the
propagation delay contributed by the polysilicon layer. Simulation results in cadence
environment indicate that unused silicon spaces can be entirely covered to protect the
main circuit against possible Trojan insertions. The simulation results also show that a
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minor removal of the polysilicon layer to insert even a single inverter can readily be
detected by the on-chip readout circuit. Even though CMOS 180nm technology is used in
this work as a proof of concept, the same concept will also hold for more recent CMOS
technologies. As the TDC resolution depends mainly upon the implemented time
amplifier, not the technology.
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Chapter 3
A METHOD
TO PREVENT HARDWARE TROJANS
A METHOD
TO PREVENT
HARDWARE TROJANS
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3.1

INTRODUCTION

Any Integrated Circuit (IC) fabrication is divided into several stages, such as design,
generating schematics or netlist, fabrication, packaging, and testing. In the early days,
any semiconductor company could handle all of these steps in house. As technology
evolved, new fabrication facilities had to be installed to facilitate that new technology,
which meant investing billions of dollars. At the same time, as more industries got
involved in IC fabrication, the design to production time, the competition to produce
semiconductor design consisting of smaller and smaller transistors and various other
factors has also started playing a significant role. To meet all these challenges, in the
recent era, companies are more and more adopting “fly-light” model by going fabless, in
which the first choice of semiconductor companies is to outsource all the silicon
fabrication to foundries [1]. The advantage of outsourcing is that it lowers a big burden
for the company to maintain or build a billion-dollar fabrication unit to meet the industry
need to produce small and smaller ICs. This move ensured that companies could supply
different ICs at a cheaper rate as the manufacturing cost has been reduced, but there are
many security concerns associated with outsourcing the manufacturing of ICs in
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untrusted foundries. Those foundries can modify the original design by adding extra gates
to establish a backdoor to the main circuit and to reveal sensitive information stored on
the chip. All these hardware changes which provide backdoor entry to the main
functionality of the circuit are called Hardware Trojan (HT). Hardware security is
becoming a major concern for IC designers. Any modern electronic device, such as RFID
tags, IoT (Internet of Things) devices, home appliances or even biomedical equipment
can be vulnerable to a security threat [2-4] if it is infected with a Hardware Trojan. If an
attacker has the knowledge of complete functionality of the original circuit, he/she can
design Hardware Trojans in such a manner that they can easily be added in the
manufacturing flow of an IC with a small footprint as compared to the area occupied by
the chip. Also, the knowledge of the original circuit helps the attacker mask the effect of
HT insertion. Moreover. as technology evolved, the size of the transistors has been
shrinking steadily, reducing the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) due to their low power
requisite. As a result, the effect of any small Trojan insertion can be masked more easily
[5]. The insertion of an HT can heavily compromise the reliability and functionality of an
IC or the system [6-8]. These Trojans are responsible not only for leaking information or
secret keys stored in the chip, but they also can jeopardize the functionality of the circuit.
Sometimes, these functionality changes are so severe that it fails or freezes or even makes
the system to crash.
Trojans can be added to the main circuit during the fabrication process, which in
addition to a security threat, can induce an economic loss related to IC production. HTs
can be inserted into the original circuit to perform any or all the following three tasks (a)
faulty operation or modification of the main function, (b) electrical modification, and (c)
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reliability reduction [9]. To address the problems of hardware Trojans at various stages of
IC design flow, many solutions have been discussed regarding Hardware Trojan detection
[8-18] and prevention [24-34].
At a broad level, hardware Trojan can be divided into three categories [8]: (a) logic
testing, (b) side-channel analysis, and (c) reverse engineering. In the Logic Testing
method, test vectors are applied during the testing phase of an IC. It also covers stuck at
faults using scan chain-based test technique or analyzing test patters with good known
patterns in Built-In-Self Test technique (BIST) [10, 11]. When used for HT detection, the
main drawback of this method is that it is unrealistic to check for all the possible logic
combinations in a complex IC, which enables the possibility for advanced hardware
Trojans to remain undetected; thus giving the hardware attackers opportunity to use rare
logic conditions as Trojan triggers. Another disadvantage of this technique is the
limitation posed by the lack of observability and the lack of controllability in
manufactured IC due to a large number of IP cores in ASICs and millions of nano-scale
building blocks in an IC. Moreover, the test infrastructures may be denied the possibility
to detect an HT insertion via a minute alteration of the HT trigger [12]. The physical
parameters of the circuit like analyzing the power profile when the IC is performing
critical steps, for example analyzing round key operations at different cycles of AES
encryption, or analyzing either transient current or electromagnetic spectrum or the delay
produced by the gates can also be used to detect Hardware Trojan, which are classified as
side-channel analysis [13, 14]. This technique is a non-invasive one as it does not tamper
the circuit under attack. This method is successfully used to extract critical information
such as cryptography keys from IC systems. It can also be utilized to detect Trojan
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activities. This method commonly requires a trusted golden circuit for result comparison.
As the latest IC technologies work at the lower supply voltages, the Signal-to-NoiseRatio (SNR) of these ICs is lower compared to previous technologies. Therefore, the
background noise and even process variations can mask Trojan activities and prevent
them from detection through side-channel analysis. An important point to consider in this
technique is that the delay of logic gates is highly affected by the supply voltage or the
voltage drop. As the voltage drop increases, the delay of the gate also increases. In
addition, other parameters which can affect gate delay are channel length (L), channel
width of transistor (w), the thickness of oxide (TOX), threshold voltage of the transistor
(Vth); process and environmental variations also can affect the delay if the ICs are not
manufactured at the same temperature [15]. Accounting for all these variables make HT
detection using side-channel analysis very difficult. To increase the percentage variation
caused by an HT circuit compared to the original circuit, a Design for Hardware Trust
(DfHT) technique has been presented in [16], where the design switching of any target
region can be localized while keeping others quiet. This reduces total circuit switching
activity, which increases the Trojan-to-circuit Switching Activity (TCA) and the power
consumption ratio between the original to Trojan circuit. This helps the Trojan detection
by magnifying the Trojan’s contribution. The authors of [17] have presented another
DfHT technique where a protection structure using an optically active protective TiO2-TiTiO2 layer stack with an angular dependent reflectivity has been used for the silicon chip
backside. The light reflected off the backside of the chip highlights strong angledependent reflectivity, which alters if the backside is affected by any hardware attack.
Another contribution of this method is its ability to create a signal to verify whether such
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an attack took place or not, by creating a pattern of photocurrents during the IC running
state. No additional mask or circuitry is needed for this technique. The reverse
engineering method, presented in [18], is a powerful HT detection method compared to
the other techniques. However, it is a costly and destructive approach. Moreover, when a
small portion of the fabricated ICs is infected, reverse engineering may fail as healthy ICs
may get selected for reverse engineering. The third-party IP (3PIP) cores also add an
extra layer of challenge while detecting Trojans. Cores from a third party can be divided
into three main categories: (a) soft, (b) firm and (c) hard [19]. Soft cores are the ones that
are written using hardware description language such as Verilog/VHDL. The firm core is
characterized by some specific libraries provided by the design foundries and moving
through synthesis without using physical layout. This core can be used to optimize the
area through placement and routing and known as a synthesized code. The hard core is
described by a hard layout using physical design libraries and recognizable in the form of
a GDSII file, which is a collection of mask level blocks. Researchers have proposed
different ideas [20-23] as countermeasures for HTs inserted into 3PIP cores. Finding
hardware Trojans in these 3PIP cores is very difficult as the codes or the libraries or the
GDSII files for those are provided by the third-party designer and they may include
Hardware Trojans within them without the knowledge of the user as there is no
benchmark Trojan-free core or golden core which can be compared with Trojan infected
core. If the core is infected with Trojan code, all the fabricated ICs will be infected with
that Trojan circuit. In a nutshell, it is very difficult to detect Hardware Trojan as there are
many possible ways to insert a Trojan and there are a lot of varieties depending on
various factors such as circuit type, trigger/payload type, desired outcome of the Trojan
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circuit and so on. Most of the detection methods work well for certain classes of Trojans
while are unable to even detect some other types. A comprehensive solution to detect all
types of Trojans is yet far from reach. Moreover, once a Trojan is inserted, the damage is
done; and even if it is detected, the infected device needs to be discarded. Trojan
prevention methods, on the other hand, have the advantage of protecting the IC in the
first place.
The methodologies for HT prevention can be classified into three different groups
[24]: (a) logic obfuscation, (b) compact GDS-II layout generation, and (c) layout filling.
A logic obfuscation method has been introduced in [25], where the researchers have
added some reconfigurable circuits to the main design. This way, the manufacturer is
unable to determine the functionality of the main circuit and the circuit is protected
against reverse engineering. Another logic obfuscation method is proposed in [26], where
a secure-by-construction split manufacturing flow has been introduced to obfuscate the
netlist. This method is capable of being used for both 2.5D or 3D IC protection.
However, it is not able to prevent Hardware Trojan insertion during the process of the die
stacking and TSV bonding. IC camouflaging [27] and Logic Locking [28, 29] also have
been classified as obfuscation methodologies. Researchers in [30] have summarized all
the latest obfuscation methods with their pros and cons. A compact GDS-II layout has
been generated in [31] by adding dummy flip-flops (FFs). Even though this idea was the
building block for various new layout filling approach, it has some major concerns as the
detection of the removal of any of those dummy-FFs is impractical due to the fact that
those cells do not produce any function. Thus, the risk of HT insertion into the layout
remains. One of the more efficient methods is a layout filling approach described in [32],
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where the unused spaces in the layout have been filled with functional cells. However,
this method only is capable of filling approximately 90% of the whole existing layout.
Another HT prevention method using layout filling approach, called Built-In Self
Authentication (BISA), has been proposed in [33]. The authors of this manuscript added
standard library cells along with Test Pattern Generator (TPG) and Output Response
Analyzer (ORA) to the main layout in order to fill the unused area. Another technique for
filling empty spaces using functional cells is introduced in [34] where both shift registers
and functional cells (used in [33]) are substituted with Multiple Input Shift Registers
(MISRs) and Output Response Analyzers (ORAs). All these methods are somewhat
vulnerable to Trojan insertion as none of these can fill 100% of the unused die area
regardless of any condition. The possibility of using functional cells to fill the unused die
area also depends on the initial occupation ratio; the maximum being 85%, as reported in
[32]. If the original circuit occupies more than the reported percentage of the die, these
methods cannot be used to prevent HT insertion. Moreover, their performances degrade
with increasing circuit-complexity.
This paper presents a new Design-For-Security (DFS) idea for HT prevention, in
which the attackers are deprived of any space to insert the active components of any
malicious circuitry. The proposed method in this work is much easier to implement
compared to the other prevention methods relying on filling the silicon area with
functional cells. It also supports full occupation regardless of the initial occupation ratio
and does not consume any power during normal operation mode. In the proposed method,
after completion of the main circuit design, the path to the active layer is blocked by
covering the unused polysilicon layer using minimum feature wires. As polysilicon
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connects to the active layer directly without the need for any contact, no extra component
can be added to the circuit without removing a portion of these polysilicon wires. Such an
alteration can be detected by both the implemented readout circuit, inspired by the DelayDetection-Module (DDM) proposed in [35] and the signature detection circuit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the proposed
method is explained in
(a)
section II; section III discusses the readout circuit; section IV presents the simulation
results; and finally, section V summarizes the concluding remarks.
(a)

3.2

PROPOSED METHOD
(a)

The idea proposed in this article is twofold: (a) measure the delay of the added
polysilicon wires while keeping the main circuit is in rest mode (which will reduce if a
(a) to insert a Trojan), and (b)
Trojan is inserted, as the polysilicon wires need to be removed

observe and analyze the signature obtained during the normal operation of the main
circuit (it will change if a Trojan is inserted, as both the induced
magnetic and electric
(a)
field will change due to structural change of the polysilicon wires).
A

(a)

Delay Measurement

As part of the fabrication process for CMOS technologies, the metal layers are
connected through contacts to the active silicon layer for (a)
the purposes of routing. The
attackers can be deprived of the resources to insert functional Trojans by denying them
access to the active layer (n+ or p+ implant) to make any unauthorized connection to that
(a)

layer. The polysilicon layer, which is separated by a thin oxide layer as shown in Fig. 3.1,
can be utilized to cover the silicon substrate region, where the active regions are formed.
(a)

ICs are designed using different active regions routed through polysilicon and metal
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(a)

Polysilicon

Metal
n – well
Contacts

Gate Oxide
(a)

Polysilicon
n+ Implant

p+ Implant
Silicon (p-type)
Gate Oxide layer
(b)
Figure 3.1. A typical CMOS process indicating layout layers: (a) 3D view (b) Top view [36].

layers. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the polysilicon connects directly to the active region through
a very thin gate oxide layer. On the other hand, the metal layers are connected to the
active region by some contacts. So, if the unused polysilicon layer is covered using
minimum feature wires, attackers will not be able to access the substrate layer to insert
the active layer necessary for Trojan insertion. Any small removal of the polysilicon wire
will alter the path delay and overall parasitic capacitance of the polysilicon layer, which
can be detected by an on-chip readout circuit. The electric field induced to the polysilicon
wire will also change, which will affect the induced signature. A conceptual design of the
routing of a simple circuit was created using HFSS (High-Frequency Structure Simulator)
to evaluate the effect of polysilicon removal on the distribution of the electric field and
the path delay. 3D full-wave simulation results in Fig. 3.2 show the distribution of the
electric field before and after removal of a small portion of the polysilicon layer
accounting for less than 1% of the total polysilicon area. The change in the electric field
is due to the variation of the polysilicon layer’s structure, parasitic capacitance and path
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Figure 3.2. 3D full wave simulation indicating the electric field difference between (a) the original and (b)
the Trojan affected design.

resistance. The relationship between the electric field and the parasitic capacitance of the
polysilicon layer can be determined from the stored energy as:
𝑛

1
1
𝑊1 = 𝐶𝑝1 𝑉 2 = ∑ 𝜀𝐸𝑖2 𝑑𝑣
2
2

(1)

𝑖=1

(1)

58

(1)

(1)

(a)

Delay-Line-1
D11

D12

D13

D1N

Out1
Signature

D1
Clock

Path-1

CUT
D2

Time to
Digital
Converter

CP/
LPF

PFD

Path-2

DLL

ΔT

D21

D22

AMP

N(ΔT)

D23

Out2

D2N

Delay-Line-2
(b)
Figure 3.3. (a) Conventional Delay Locked Loop, (b) Readout Circuit with Signature detection block.

where W is the energy stored, CP is the parasitic capacitance, V is the applied voltage and
Ei is the electric field of discrete points in the device and v is the volume of between the
ground plane and the polysilicon layer. The effect of removal of less than 1% of the total
polysilicon area is shown in Fig. 3.2 (b). Consequently, the stored energy changes to:
𝑛

1
1
𝑊2 = 𝐶𝑝2 𝑉 2 = ∑ 𝜀𝐸𝑗2 𝑑𝑣
2
2

(2)

𝑗=1

(2)
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Since V and ε are constants, from (1) and (2) we can write:
∆𝐶𝑝 ∝ ∆𝐸 2

(3)

(3)
where ∆𝐶𝑝 = 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 and ∆𝐸 2 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝐸𝑖2 − ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝐸𝑗2 . The variation in the time
constant of the polysilicon layer can be determined from τ=R∆Cp, where 𝑅 is the total
(3)
resistance of the polysilicon layer. Even though ΔCp can be realized using a capacitor, the
(3)
time constant will not remain the same due to the variation in resistance, and hence, the
delay will change. Simulations conducted in the circuit level indicate that this variation
(3)
can readily be detected by observing the path delay. The path delay is measured using the
readout circuit shown in Fig. 3.3. The poly area was divided into 8 segments to ensure
(3)
that the area of each segment is small enough to detect a minor area removal. The number
(3)
of segments depends on the minimum detectable size of a Trojan. As the number of
segments increases, the smaller size Trojans can be detected.
B

(3)

Detecting Signature Variation
(3)
During the normal mode of the main circuit, the routing lines create both electric and

(3)
magnetic fields; a portion of which is induced in the added polysilicon wires. These filler
routing lines will induce voltage following the principle of coupled transmission lines
(3)
[37]. The response can be characterized by their resistances (RR, RP) and self and mutual
inductances (LR, LP, LM) and capacitances (CR, CP, CM) per unit length, where subscripts
(3)
R, P, and M represent Routing line, Polysilicon and Mutual respectively. The equivalent
(3)
model of a single routing line and the polysilicon wires is shown in Fig. 3.4 (a) and the
equivalent circuit model is shown in Fig. 3.4 (b). The voltage at point “a” can be found
(3)
by:
(3)
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(3)

Signal Path of the Main Circuit

AMP
Polysilicon Wires, where Voltage will be Induced
(a)

x

Va
RS
Vin

LS
CS

Coupling
Circuit

CM
LM

Signature
Detector

Xpoly
f(RP, CP, LP)

Equivalent Circuit of the
Buffer and the Routing Path

Vb

AMP

Vind

(b)
Figure 3.4. (a) Block diagram of a typical routing path and the polysilicon wire underneath (b) The
equivalent schematic diagram of the same showing the coupling circuit.

𝑉𝑎 = 𝑉𝑖𝑛

𝑋𝐶𝑅
𝑅𝑅 + 𝑋𝐿𝑅 + 𝑋𝐶𝑅

(4)

(4)
where Vin represents the input signal at point “x”, RR, LR, and CR are the resistance,
inductance, and capacitance of the routing line. So, the voltage at point “b”, induced by
(4)
the polysilicon wire, can be represented as:
(4)
𝑋𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦
𝑉𝑏 = 𝑉𝑎 (
)
𝑋𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦 + 𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

(5)
(4)

(5)
𝑋𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = (𝑅𝑅 +
(4)
𝑋𝐿𝑅 )‖𝑋𝐶𝑅 . The voltage found by equation 5 is for a single routing line whereas a circuit
(5)
where

𝑋𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦 = (𝑅𝑃 + 𝑋𝐿𝑃 )‖𝑋𝐶𝑃 ,

𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑋𝐿𝑀 ‖𝑋𝐶𝑀
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and

(4)
(5)
(4)

has many such lines. If n represents the total number of routing lines, the total induced
voltage after amplification, Vind can be written as:
𝑛

𝑛

𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑 = 𝐴 ∑ 𝑉𝑏𝑖 = ∑
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

𝐴𝑉𝑎𝑖 (𝑋𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑖 )
𝑋𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑖 + 𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝑋𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖

(6)

(6)
where A is the gain of the amplifier. This induced voltage will act as a unique signature
for the IC as the waveform will depend on the position of the polysilicon wires relative(6)
to
the routing paths, as it will affect the amount of induction.
(6)
3.3

READOUT CIRCUIT
(6)

A

Description of the Readout Circuit
(6)
The readout circuit includes a Circuit-Under-Test (CUT) module, a modified Delay

Locked Loop (DLL) for time measurement and a Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC), (6)
as
shown in Fig. 3.3 (b). The main advantage of utilizing a DLL for time measurement is its
(6)
robustness against Process, Voltage, and Temperature (PVT) variations. It is shown in the
simulation section that for a ±5% process variation, the propagation delay changes by less
(6)
than ±1%. A conventional DLL includes a Phase Frequency Detector (PFD), Charge
(6)
Pump (CP), Low Pass Filter (LPF) and delay-line modules, as shown in Fig. 3.3 (a). The
DLL adjusts the propagation delay of its delay-line to reduce the time difference between
(6)
the signals applied to the PFD. In the locked state, the signals applied to the PDF are
aligned and ideally, the time difference between them becomes zero. The block diagram
(6)
of the readout circuit is shown in Fig. 3.3 (b). A CUT is added to the DLL feedback loop
(6)
to measure the delay difference between its signal paths. The readout circuit also includes
two delay-lines used to amplify the time difference captured by the DLL.

(6)
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(6)

When the DLL in the readout circuit captures the lock, the rising edges at the PFD
input are aligned as shown in Fig. 3.3 (b). Since the same clock signal is applied to both
D1 and D2 cells, we can write:
𝑇𝐷1 + 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ_1 = 𝑇𝐷2 + 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ_2

(7)

𝑇𝐷1 − 𝑇𝐷2 = 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2 − 𝑇𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ1 = ∆𝑇

(8)

and therefore, we have:

where TD1 and TD2 are the propagation delay of D1 and D2 cells respectively and Tpath1
and Tpath2 represent the path-1 and path-2 propagation delays in the circuit-under-test.
From equation 8 it is evident that the delay difference between cells D1 and D2 makes up
the delay difference between the two paths of CUT. A Time Amplifier (TA), proposed in
[38], is then used to amplify this delay. Delay-Line-1 and Delay-Line-2 in the readout
circuit are used to amplify the delay difference between the CUT paths. The first delay
line is composed of D1 cells while the second one is built using D2 cells. Therefore, the
delay difference between the outputs of the two delay lines marked as Out 1 and Out2 in
Fig. 3.3 (b), becomes N∆T. This amplification of the delay relaxes the design requirement
for the time-to-digital converter (TDC) and enables the TDC to measure the delay
difference between the CUT paths a with a high-resolution measurement. The operation
detail of the readout circuit is presented in [35].
To test the propagation delay of the polysilicon layer, the CUT in the readout circuit in
Fig. 3.3 (b) is designed as shown in Fig. 3.5. The propagation delay caused by the
polysilicon layer is represented by a delay cell in Fig. 3.5. The circuit also incorporates a
self-test path to test and ensure that the readout circuit has not been tampered with. The
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Path-1

S0

}

To PFD

Figure 3.5. Circuit-Under-Test.

polysilicon layer can be divided into several separate segments to increase the
measurement resolution. In this case, each segment is selected separately to measure its
nominal propagation delay. There are two modes of operation for the readout circuit, the
“Self-Test Mode” and the “Run Mode”.
B

Working Principle of the Readout Circuit
A clock signal is fed to the input of the readout circuit in Fig. 3.3 (b). Initially, the

readout circuit is run in the “Self-Test” mode to confirm the proper functioning of the
readout circuit and to calibrate the device. Then the run mode is selected. The polysilicon
layer in the CUT introduces a delay to the signal path-2. As explained in section 3A, the
DLL feedback system compensates for the delay to acquire lock. Once the lock is
captured, we have:
𝑇𝐷1 − 𝑇𝐷2 = ∆𝑇 = 𝑇𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦 + 𝑇𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡

(9)

where TPoly is the propagation delay contributed by the polysilicon layer. Since the offset
delay of the readout circuit is determined during calibration in the self-test mode, the
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Original Circuit

Polysilicon Layer (Red)

Readout Circuit

Figure 3.6. The IC with Polysilicon and Readout Circuit added.

propagation delay due to the polysilicon layer can readily be calculated and delay
variations from the nominal values can be identified.

3.4

SIMULATION RESULTS

To validate the proposed method, the readout circuit was implemented in the Cadence
environment where the polysilicon layer was used to cover the unused silicon area to
ensure that it will not be utilized for Trojan insertion. The red area in Fig. 3.6 shows the
polysilicon layer which is divided into 8 segments. After filling out the empty spaces
with polysilicon, the readout circuit was tested in the self-test-mode to determine the
offset delay. To perform the self-test, initially, the control voltage, VCNT, of the VCDL
was kept at 0 V. The input and output signals of the readout circuit at the locked state,
with the control voltage set to zero, are shown in Fig. 3.7 (a). Fig. 3.7 (b) shows the
locked condition with VCNT settling at 953.8 mV. The initial delay between the input and
output signals is 17.85 ps, as indicated in Fig. 3.7 (c). As the control voltage increases
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Figure 3.7. (a) Control Voltage of the DLL (b) The Locked Signal and (c) Delay between the Output and
the Input Signals.

from 0 to 1.8 V, the delay rises linearly from 17.85 ps to 66.43 ps, shown in Fig. 3.8. The
minimum area required for a Trojan insertion depends on the type of Trojan and the size
of the gate. An inverter from the standard cell library of 0.18µm CMOS technology,
shown in Fig. 3.9 (a), was added to the circuit to see if the proposed method can detect a
small hardware manipulation. The minimum area of the polysilicon layer that must be
removed to place this gate is around 14.85 μm2, as shown in Fig 3.9 (b). Figure 3.9 (c)
presents the delay associated with the polysilicon of Fig. 3.9 (b) which is about 4.65 ps.
The implemented readout circuit can readily detect such a small delay.
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Figure 3.8. Relationship between VCDL Delay and Control Voltage.
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Figure 3.9. (a) Typical TSMC Inverter (b) Minimum poly needed to be removed to place that inverter (c)
Delay caused by that poly.

The change in the delay associated with such removal was also observed. As shown in
Fig. 3.10 (a), the delay of the routing segment 2 is 90.26 ps. Later the same simulation
was performed with the layout of Fig. 3.9 to see the effect of the removal of a portion of
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Figure 3.10. (a) Delay of the original routing segment 2; (b) Delay variation due to the removal of a portion
of the polysilicon wire.
TABLE 3.1. TDC OUTPUT SHOWING LINEAR RELATION WITH DELAY
Seg.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Delay
(pS)
86.38
90.26
94.15
90.20
86.34
93.98
90.58
86.23

TDC Output
D9
D8
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0

D7
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

D0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

the polysilicon wires. As can be seen in Fig. 3.10 (b) such a removal decreases the path
delay by 9.25 ps. The output of the TDC is shown in Table 3.1 for different routing paths.
The result shows that each path has an almost similar delay. As seen from the table, the
TDC can detect a delay variation of about 4 ps.
The signature was also obtained for the whole circuit, which is shown in Fig. 3.11
along with the effect of adding extra polysilicon wires. Fig. 3.11 (a) shows the output of
the original circuit without the polysilicon wires, whereas Fig. 3.11 (b) shows the same
output with the wires added to the circuit. The difference between the first and second
waveforms is shown in Fig 3.11 (c), with a maximum error range of 500 μV, while the
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Figure 3.11. Output voltage (a) without probe (b) with probe; (c) difference between a and b; and (d) The
unique signature.

shape of the output remains the same. This indicates that the addition of those extra
polysilicon lines barely affects the performance of the circuit. The unique signature
obtained from the circuit is shown in Fig. 3.11 (d), which is reproducible as the same
signature will be generated for the same input. This signature will change if either the
placement of the probe is altered, or a portion of it is removed.
To verify that statement, a portion of the polysilicon routing was removed to simulate
the effect of Trojan insertion, which is shown by a small circle in Fig. 3.12. Then
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Figure 3.12. The IC with polysilicon layer partially removed to insert Trojan.

transient simulations were performed to find the delay associated with each routing path
of the original design of Fig. 3.6. The effect of the polysilicon removal on the signature is
shown in Fig. 3.13. The signature obtained by the original design of the polysilicon wires
is shown in Fig. 3.13 (a), whereas the signature after removing part of that said
polysilicon wire is shown in Fig. 3.13 (b). The difference between these two waveforms
is shown in Fig. 3.13 (c), which varies between – 0.6 mV and + 0.9 mV. The change in
the voltage level is high enough to easily detect. Moreover, as the shape of the signature
also changes, the detection becomes much easier.
The Monte-Carlo simulations performed to check the effect of process variation show
that even though the voltage level of the signature varies considerably; the shape of the
signature remains unchanged. The parameters of the polysilicon wires were varied by
±10% over a simulation of 500 iterations. The output of the simulation is shown in Fig.
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Figure 3.13. Graph showing change between the signatures of the original and the manipulated design.

3.14. Fig. 3.14 (a) shows the output of the original circuit, which indicates that it remains
unchanged regardless of any variation of the probe. As shown in Fig. 3.14 (b), the DC
offset of the signature varies considerably by as much as 135 mV. The frequency content
of the signature and accordingly the shape of the signature remains unchanged, whereas
any change in the model of the probe varies the shape of the signature.
Simulations were also performed to see the effects of temperature and process
variations on the path delay. The effects of the temperature variations are shown in Fig.
3.15 (a). The simulation result shows a path delay variation of less than ±1% when the
temperature is varied from –50º C to 100º C. The length and the width of the polysilicon
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Monte Carlo Simulation

(a)

(b)
Figure 3.14. Monte Carlo Simulation for 500 iterations: (a) Output of the main circuit; (b) The signature.
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TABLE 3.2. COMPARISON WITH CURRENT METHODS
Method

Maximum Initial
Occupation Ratio

Final Occupation

Paper [32]

Maximum 85%

>90%

Paper [33]

Dependent, but not
reported

93%-99%

Paper [34]

Maximum 80%

99%-100%

Proposed

Independent

100%
(poly)

Dependency on the IC
HT Detection
Size
Dependent, but not
reported
Does not work well for
bigger ICs
Cannot fill 100%
complex circuits
Independent of IC size

Hard
Hard
Hard
Relatively Easier

was also varied by ±5%. The corresponding outputs, shown in Fig. 3.15 (b) and (c),
indicate a variation of less than ±1% in each case. These are expected results due to the
internal feedback of the employed DLL. The DLL adjusts its path delays due to its
internal feedback to capture the lock regardless of the temperature and process variations.
The feedback system in the readout circuit makes the overall measurement module
resilient against temperature fluctuations and process variations.
Table 3.2 shows the comparison of the proposed method with the reported techniques
in the literature. Using the proposed method, 100% of the unused polysilicon layer can be
covered regardless of the initial occupation ratio, whereas other methods depend upon the
initial occupation ratio to determine what percentage of the unused spaces can be
populated. In all those techniques, different cells, preferably FFs, are used to cover the
empty space which limits the occupation of the empty spaces. With the proposed method,
as the poly layer is fully occupied, no cell can be inserted without removing a portion of
the poly. Moreover, the removal of even a small portion of the polysilicon layer to insert
a Trojan can easily be detected both by the readout and the signature detection modules.
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3.5

CONCLUSION

As the use of outside foundry becomes more popular, the threat of hardware security
increases. As a preventative measure against any malicious insertion of Trojans, a new
and easy-to-implement solution is presented in this paper. The proposed method uses
minimum feature wires to cover unused spaces of the polysilicon layer of the die. As a
result, attackers will not have access to the resources to implement and route the Trojan
circuits, as no active layer can be accessed without removing a portion of the polysilicon
wire, which will affect the characteristics of the polysilicon wires. The proposed method
of this article prevents Trojan insertion by denying access to the active layer and at the
same time detects any possible Trojan insertion in two separate methods: (a) using a DLL
based readout circuit to measure the propagation delay contributed by the polysilicon
layer (b) a signature detection block to verify the signature obtained by the polysilicon
wires. Simulation results in cadence environment indicate that unused silicon spaces can
be entirely covered to protect the main circuit against possible Trojan insertions. The
simulation results also show that a minor removal of the polysilicon layer to insert even a
single inverter can readily be detected by the on-chip readout circuit. The signature
verification block also supports the results obtained by the readout circuit, by changing
the signature for the same polysilicon wire removal. Both Monte Carlo and PVT variation
simulations show a robust response. Even though CMOS 180nm technology is used in
this work as a proof of concept, the same concept will also hold for more recent CMOS
technologies. As the TDC resolution depends mainly upon the implemented time
amplifier, not the technology.
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Chapter 4
ON-CHIP MAGNETIC PROBES FOR HARDWARE
ON-CHIP
MAGNETIC PROBES FOR HARDWARE
TROJAN
PREVENTION
AND
ETECTION
TROJAN
PREVENTION
AND
DD
ETECTION
4.1

INTRODUCTION

With the shrinking transistor sizes near to the limits, 3D IC technologies have emerged
as viable solutions to keep up with the demand to add more functionalities to a single
chip. The costs of fabrication facilities for these new technologies left many companies
with no choice other than outsourcing their IC fabrication needs. A 3D IC is usually
fabricated by stacking different 2D layers together. The stacked dies are bonded using
Through Silicon Vias (TSV). 3D ICs have some advantages over 2D chips, such as (a) a
3D IC can be fabricated using split manufacturing by distributing the routing of a single
circuit across different dies, which masks the functionality of the circuit, (b) modified
versions of conventional 2D IC security solutions can be added to different dies to
enhance the security of each die [1]. It also conceals the details of the circuit design once
the dies are stacked together, making reverse engineering challenging [2]. Moreover, the
stacked structure of a 3D IC also makes it easier to obtain active layers from different
foundries. The major concern with this approach is the possibility of insertion of
malicious circuitry, called Hardware Trojan (HT), from untrusted facilities [3, 4]. HTs are
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commonly inserted to alter the behavior of an IC, to access a crypto key or to deny the
user the intended service [5]. HTs are also utilized to weaken the immunity of integrated
circuits to inject false data using electromagnetic waves [6]. There is a direct correlation
between the intensity of electromagnetic (EM) radiation and the information leakage.
According to [7], it is possible to generate both the EM radiation map and the information
leakage map of a cryptographic device simultaneously by scanning the device. Moreover,
it is reported that the randomness of a ring oscillator (RO) based True Random Number
Generator (TRNG) can be undermined by inducing sinusoidal electromagnetic waves [8].
Hardware Trojans are different in the sense that each of them is designed to serve a
specific purpose, sometimes under certain predetermined conditions. As a result, each HT
has unique physical characteristics with a specific functionality and activation mechanism
[9]. This makes the detection of an HT very difficult. It is quite challenging to account for
all possible hardware malicious modifications in any stage of IC fabrication or postfabrication. The minute size of HTs also compounds to that challenge, as HTs usually
occupy a small area of the main circuit [10]. The introduction of 3D IC reduces the
vulnerability against reverse engineering attacks but introduces some new and more
dangerous threats [2, 11]. The noise in 3D ICs is commonly higher compared to its
conventional 2D counterparts, which can mask the effects of HT on the main circuit.
Moreover, the limited access to the internal layers makes it even harder to detect HTs
once the IC is fabricated. The solutions developed to ensure hardware security can be
divided into two major groups of (a) HT detection and (b) HT prevention.
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A

HT Detection
In this technique, the design flow of the original circuit is not hampered, and the IC is

tested for possible insertion of HT once the fabrication process is completed. Researchers
have used different techniques, such as logic testing, side-channel analysis, and visual
inspection to detect possible HT insertion.
In the logic testing methods [12-14], a set of predefined test stimuli is applied to the
ICs under evaluation. The responses are then compared with the expected ones; any
deviation from which indicates a trojan insertion. In this method, it is assumed that the
HT changes the functionality of the IC and therefore it cannot protect circuits against
information leaking or denial of service attacks.
The side-channel analysis-based methods monitor the variations of different physical
characteristics such as power, temperature [15], and electromagnetic (EM) profiles [1517], path delay measurement [18, 19], static distribution of the supply voltage [20] or
relationship between dynamic current and maximum operating frequency [21, 22] to
detect HT insertion. It is assumed that inserting a malicious circuit affects these
parameters in such a way that the infected ICs can be detected. This method relies on
comparison with a golden reference IC, which is proven difficult to obtain [1]. Most of
the approaches using this technique [15-20] rely on invasive methods to obtain an HTfree golden IC, which is costly and time-consuming. Moreover, the introduction of
nanoscale technologies threatens to make these detection methods obsolete by masking
the effect of a small HT due to their poor signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) [23].
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Visual inspection [24, 25] is based on the idea of observing the top-level metal layer
and comparing it with the original layout. However, non-destructive visual inspection
methods cannot account for HTs designed on low metal layers.
Machine learning [26] and isolation-based hardware techniques [27, 28] have been
utilized to detect HTs in IP cores used as building blocks for 3D ICs. The main objective
of this work is to detect Trojans on 2D and 3D ICs and the detection of HTs in third party
IP cores is beyond the scope of this paper. Most of the Trojan detection methods are
designed to detect a specific type of HT or focus on a specific performance parameter
variation and therefore a well-designed Trojan can remain undetected. Moreover, the
effect of noise and Process, Voltage and Temperature (PVT) variations are usually
ignored during the detection process, which can mask the effect of an HT.
B

HT prevention
The limitations and complexities of HT detection methods have motivated IC

designers to modify design flow to enable HT prevention. Design-for-Hardware-Trust
(DfHT) techniques are being developed to facilitate HT prevention and support better
detection at the same time. These methods are commonly used to detect HTs through
differences between the characteristics of a Trojan free IC and an infected one. To that
extent, researchers have developed solutions to obscure the functionality of ICs [29-34],
as the creation of an HT demands a good understanding of the original circuit
functionality. The authors of [29] introduced netlist-level obfuscation, where the gatelevel netlist of a pre-synthesized IP core is modified and then resynthesized to obtain
maximum functional and structural obfuscation at low design overhead. In [30, 31],
different methods of state-obfuscation are presented, where the states of different
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components of the circuit are obfuscated using security keys. An interesting idea is
presented in [32] using dummy contact-based IC camouflaging techniques, where the
functionality of a circuit is masked using dummy contacts. As a result, the same layout of
a cell can represent different gates depending on where dummy contacts are placed. A
DfHT technique is presented in [33] using new design techniques and new memory
technologies to detect a wide variety of HTs during both IC testing in-field operation. At
the same time, this technique can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis,
place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. The idea presented in [34] uses gates of different
doping concentrations to vary their threshold voltages and thus create threshold
dependent camouflaged cells. Attackers can use various approaches to determine the
identities of camouflaged gates, such as: measuring the etch rate to find the heavily doped
transistors and profiling the difference in power and delay characteristics of camouflaged
gates to determine their identities [34].
Another idea is to create the design as dense as possible by “layout filling” technique
to prevent an attacker from exploiting the available spaces, after the place and route [3539]. As this method deprives the attacker of the space required for inserting malicious
circuitry, it has the potential to be used as an effective method for HT prevention. This
technique can also be used in 3D IC design. The proposed methods using this technique
are discussed in detail in the next section. The existing literature regarding the hardware
security of 3D IC is also discussed in the same section.
In this work, a new method is presented to prevent HT insertion by depriving
malicious parties of routing resources. In the proposed solution, after the main circuit
implementation, the unused metal and polysilicon layers are fully utilized to design on85

chip magnetic probes. As a result, there is no room left for the routing of the Trojan
circuitries. Moreover, on-chip probes are used to get the magnetic signature of the chip to
detect performance variations caused by possible HT insertion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the background
studies and the related works in 3D IC. Section III elaborates on the proposed Hardware
Trojan prevention method in detail, which is then supported by simulation results in
Section IV. Lastly, Section V includes the concluding remarks.

4.2

BACKGROUND STUDY

An efficient method of HT prevention is to make the final design of the IC as dense as
possible. To that extent, researchers have proposed different techniques to fill the unused
silicon once the original circuit is designed. The authors of [35] have used filler cells to
improve the density uniformity of the circuit. The idea is to fill the unused silicon area
using different arbitrary cells after the original circuit is designed. The main drawback of
this method is that these cells create an opportunity for the insertion of malicious circuits.
Moreover, it is difficult to identify whether any malicious circuit is inserted due to the
high circuit density. To negate that possibility, a technique called Built-In SelfAuthentication (BISA) is proposed in [36], where the unused spaces are filled using a
separate network of combinational cells. This network can be tested to identify potential
alterations and Trojan insertions into the original circuitry. A separate Built-In Self-Test
(BIST) circuit is designed using Linear Feed Back Shift Registers (LFSRs) and MultipleInput Shift-Registers (MISRs) and placed in the unused spaces to test the network. This is
an effective method for smaller ICs; but loses its effectiveness, as the size of the IC
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grows bigger. In addition, it cannot completely occupy unused spaces. A similar method
is proposed in [37], but the unused silicon layer is prioritized to improve the layout filling
efficiency. In typical circuits, some nodes are more vulnerable to be used as the trigger
for an HT. These locations, termed as “critical empty spaces” in [37], are identified using
an algorithm and filled first. The researchers used shift registers instead of a Test Pattern
Generator (TPG) and a MISR to test the functions generated by filler cells placed in the
unused spaces to reduce the area overhead. The main drawback of this method is its
dependency on the unused space left after the design of the original circuit. For a
medium-sized IC, if the unused space is less than 20%, this method is not effective.
Moreover, it does not work well for complex circuits. In [38], the authors proposed an
enhanced algorithm to derive the highest number of combinatorial functions using the
number of flip-flops (FFs) that can be inserted. They also introduced some logical gates
to the dense designs where FFs cannot be inserted. The final occupation ratio is reported
to be higher than 90%. One of the main concerns with this technique is a counterfeit filler
circuit. If the original filler circuit is replaced by a smaller design with the same output,
the saved space can be used to insert HT cells. Also, if the area of the main circuit covers
85% of a medium-size ASIC, the remaining empty spaces are not large enough to
accommodate the components required to implement this method. A different approach
of layout filling is proposed in [39], where the researchers focused on the unused
polysilicon layer instead of the silicon layer. In this method, the unused polysilicon layer
is filled using the minimum feature wires. The wires are connected to a readout circuit to
measure the delay created by that wire. Here, it is assumed that any HT needs to be
placed in the active layer. As an active layer is placed in the silicon layer and connects to
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the polysilicon placed on top of that layer directly, any HT is bound to connect to some of
those polysilicon wires as they cover the unused polysilicon layer. This will change the
delay caused by the wire; removal of a portion of the polysilicon will also do the same.
The approach thus can easily detect the insertion of any new gate.
The introduction of 3D ICs has provided attackers with various new methods to insert
HTs in ICs [2, 11]. As multiple dies from different foundries are incorporated into a
single 3D IC, some of them can be from untrusted foundries. Researchers have proposed
some ideas to take advantage of the split manufacturing method [40-43] to increase
security of 3D ICs. In this method, some of the layers are obfuscated and fabricated by
trusted foundries, whereas the other layers are fabricated in untrusted foundries. Even
though this method can eliminate most of the threats of HT insertion, it still suffers from
HT insertion opportunities unique to 3D manufacturing. The integration of multiple
layers of dies requires other intermediate levels like die stacking and TSV bonding,
during which stages a HT can be inserted. Some additional malicious circuits or dies can
be implemented, or TSVs can be exploited during these intermediate steps. 3D ICs also
suffer from thermal issues, which can form high temperature in the middle layers as an
inherent characteristic of the design type. This can result in a larger delay violation in
those layers, which can be manipulated as a trigger for the Trojan [44].

4.3

ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD

In the proposed method, after routing of the main circuit, the unused metal and
polysilicon layers are filled using minimum feature wires. There are various ways to
place those wires: it can be filled arbitrarily, or the metals can be designed as inductive
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(a)

(b)
Figure 4.1. (a) Routing of a typical Digital to Analog circuit in HFSS environment, (b) Unused layers used
as magnetic probes.

sensors. Designing inductive sensors has some distinct advantages compared to a random
distribution. Inductive sensors can be used as internal magnetic probes to capture the
induced signature of the chip when a certain portion of the main circuit is activated. At
the end of this process, there will be no resources left to connect Trojan circuits. If an
attacker tries to redesign the magnetic probes or change the main circuit placement to
access the resources to insert and rout a Trojan, it will change the signature of the IC.
Moreover, the probes are tested separately to determine any change in their properties.
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Figure 4.2. (a) A typical distribution of a signal routing path and a magnetic probe, (b) 3D illustration of a
signal trace and a probe branch pair.

A sample structure of an inductive sensor in a circuit is shown in Fig. 4.1, where the
unused spaces of a two-layer device are filled with traces of minimum width metal and
polysilicon. The filler routing lines will induce voltage to the magnetic probe following
the principle of coupled transmission lines. The response can be characterized by their
resistances (RP, RS) and self and mutual inductances (LP, LS, LM) and capacitances (CP,
CS, CM) per unit length, where subscripts P, S, and M represent Signal-Path, Sensor and
Mutual respectively. In a typical circuit, a probe branch is surrounded by different routing
lines as shown in Fig. 4.2 (a). Each probe branch and routing line pair forms a model
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Figure 4.3. (a) Block diagram of the signal trace and a probe branch pair shown in Fig. 4.2. (b) The
equivalent schematic diagram of Fig. 4.3 (a) indicating the routing path of the inverter and the coupling
circuit together with the signature detection circuit.

equivalent to the coupled transmission line, which is shown in Fig. 4.2 (b). The parasitic
capacitances to the ground plane are not shown in the figure for simplicity.
A

Circuit Model for a Magnetic Probe
Fig. 4.3 (a) shows the equivalent model for the case shown in Fig. 4.2 (b). The

equivalent lumped circuit model is shown in Fig. 4.3 (b), in which the signal picked up
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by the magnetic probe is amplified. 𝑉𝑖𝑛 represents the equivalent input signal and 𝑅𝑃 , 𝐶𝑃
and 𝐿𝑃 are the resistance, capacitance, and inductance of the equivalent circuit. The
voltage Vx can be calculated from:

𝑉 = 𝑉𝑖𝑛

𝑋𝐶𝑃
𝑋𝐶𝑃 + 𝑅𝑃 + 𝑋𝐿𝑃

(1)

(1)
where 𝑋𝐶𝑃 and 𝑅𝑃 are the lumped parameters of the equivalent circuit. The impedance of
(1)
the equivalent circuit, 𝑋𝑒𝑞 , the sensor, 𝑋𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 , and the coupling circuit, 𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 , can
be calculated from:

(1)
𝑋𝑒𝑞 = (𝑅𝑃 + 𝑋𝐿𝑃 )‖𝑋𝐶𝑃

(2)
(1)

𝑋𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = (𝑅𝑆 + 𝑋𝐿𝑆 )‖𝑋𝐶𝑆

(3)
(1)

𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑋𝐿𝑀 ‖𝑋𝐶𝑀

(4)
(1)

The probe induced voltage, Vy can then be readily found from:
𝑋𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟
𝑉𝑦 = 𝑉 (
)
𝑋𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 + 𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋𝑒𝑞

(1)
(1)
(5)

(1)
(5)
Here, Vy is the voltage induced at terminal 3 of Fig. 4.2 (b) due to a signal between the
terminals 1 and 2. As the total system has multiple “trace – probe branch” combinations,
(1)
(5)
the total induced voltage form m branches can be found by:
(1)
(5)
𝑚

𝑚

𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑 = ∑ 𝑉𝑦𝑖 = ∑
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

𝑉 𝑖 (𝑋𝑖𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 )
𝑋𝑖𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 + 𝑋𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝑋𝑖𝑒𝑞

(6)
(1)
(5)
(6)
(1)
(5)
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Figure 4.4. (a) Equivalent two-port network created by a signal trace and probe branch pair in high
frequency (b) Equivalent model of such a pair.

The lumped model can be used to approximate the circuit response at low frequencies.
At high frequencies, for response analysis, the circuit can be represented by a two-port
network as shown in Fig. 4.4 (a). The equivalent high-frequency circuit model is shown
in Fig. 4.4 (b). The induced voltage at terminal 3 of Fig. 4.2 (b) becomes:
𝑉3 = 𝑍31 𝐼1 + 𝑍32 𝐼2 + 𝑍33 𝐼3
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(7)
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(b)
Figure 4.5. Extracted model of the two-port network shown in Fig. 4.4 (a) at 500 MHz, where trace current
plays: (a) a negligible and (b) a dominant role in the induction of the probe.

where,
𝑅𝑐 𝑍𝑐1
𝑅𝜋 𝑍𝜋1
+
(1 − 𝑅𝑐 ⁄𝑅𝜋 ) sinh 𝛾𝑐 𝑙 (1 − 𝑅𝜋 ⁄𝑅𝑐 ) sinh 𝛾𝜋 𝑙

(8)

𝑅𝑐 2 𝑍𝑐1
𝑅𝜋 2 𝑍𝜋1
=
+
(1 − 𝑅𝑐 ⁄𝑅𝜋 ) sinh 𝛾𝑐 𝑙 (1 − 𝑅𝜋 ⁄𝑅𝑐 ) sinh 𝛾𝜋 𝑙

(9)

𝑅𝑐 2 𝑍𝑐1 coth 𝛾𝑐 𝑙 𝑅𝜋 2 𝑍𝜋1 coth 𝛾𝜋 𝑙
=
+
(1 − 𝑅𝑐 ⁄𝑅𝜋 )
(1 − 𝑅𝜋 ⁄𝑅𝑐 )

(10)

𝑍31 =

𝑍32

𝑍33

A detailed mathematical analysis along with the explanations of the parameters used
in equations (7 – 10) can be found in [45]. The equivalent extracted spice model, shown
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Probe Branch

(a)

Other Layer

(b)

Coupled Area

(c)

Figure 4.6. Types of structures created during an EM coupling with any metal trace or another probe
branch in another layer: probe branch crossing the other layer (a) vertically, (b) at an angle, and (c) probe
branch run along the other layer.

in Fig. 4.5, displays the induction process for different circuit compositions. When the
signal routing path is driven by a source with a negligible current, the electric coupling
becomes the dominant factor and the signal is induced on the probe through the
capacitors. Whereas when a considerable current flow through the signal routing path, the
magnetic field becomes the dominant coupling mechanism and the sensor probe is fed
through the series resistor – inductor combination. The extracted model was obtained at
500 MHz clock frequency; the extract parameters are frequency dependent.
B

Effect of the Geometric Structure on the EM Signature
A branch of the probe can from three types of structures while creating an EM

coupling with any metal trace or another probe branch in another layer. The probe branch
can simply cross the other layer at an angle, which are shown in Fig. 4.6 (a) and (b), or it
can run along the other layer, as shown in Fig. 4.6 (c). In any case, both electric and
magnetic fields will contribute towards the signature, but depending on the structure, the
mutual inductance (𝑋𝐿𝑀 ) and capacitance (𝑋𝐶𝑀 ) will change. This will result in a change
to coupling impedance (𝑋𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ) of equation (4), and hence the induced voltage (𝑉𝑖𝑛𝑑 )
of equation (6).
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C

Circuit Model for a Magnetic Probe
To make sure that a circuit modification by adversaries can be detected, the variation

of the signature must be higher than the noise level, preferably by 10 dB for reliable
detection. The noise power, 𝑃𝑛 , in a circuit [46] can be represented by:
𝑃𝑛 = 4𝑘𝐵 𝑇∆𝑓

(11)

where kB is the Boltzmann constant, T is the absolute temperature, and Δf is the
equivalent noise bandwidth. Accounting for the noise in the circuit, the induced voltage
on the magnetic probe from equation (6) is modified to:
𝑚

𝑚

∑ 𝑉𝑦𝑖 − 𝑉𝑛 ≤ 𝑉𝐼𝑛𝑑 ≤ ∑ 𝑉𝑦𝑖 + 𝑉𝑛
𝑖=1

(12)

𝑖=1

(12)
where, 𝑉𝑛 is the noise RMS voltage of resistance R, given by:
𝑉𝑛 = √4𝑘𝐵 𝑇𝑅∆𝑓

(12)
(13)

(12)
As can be seen from equation (12), the induced voltage varies between the minimum
and maximum values. This is due to the random nature of noise which can be added(12)
or
subtracted from the induced voltage. To reliably detect the induced voltage in the
(12)
presence of noise, a Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of a minimum of 10 dB is required. For
(12)
a probe made of a metal layer with 1 GHz bandwidth and an aspect ratio of 100 in CMOS
180 nm technology that has a typical sheet resistance of 0.08 Ω/µm2, the RMS noise
(12)
voltage, 𝑉𝑛 is equal to 1.15 µV. Such a probe can detect a circuit modification resulting in
(12)
more than 11.5µV.
(12)
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(12)
(12)

The die stacking in a 3D IC introduces additional thermal noise due to the lack of
possibility of heat dissipation in the internal layers. The total noise can be found by
adding this noise with the root of the sum of squares of the noise of the different dies of
that IC. For a 3D IC of i layers, the total noise is:

𝑉𝑛 𝑒𝑞 = 𝑉𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 + √𝑉𝑛12 + 𝑉𝑛 22 + ⋯ + 𝑉𝑛 2𝑖

4.4

(14)

SIMULATION RESULTS

To validate the proposed method, the routing of a simple DAC (Digital to Analog
Converter) was designed in the HFSS environment, as shown in Fig. 4.1 (a). Tempering
with the routing of the DAC affects the EM signature which can be detected by the
detection circuitry. The unused metal and polysilicon layers between the routing lines
were filled using magnetic probes of different shapes, which is shown in Fig. 4.1 (b). Any
change in the structure of the probe will also affect the EM signature and will be readily
detected. The extracted Spice model of the routing was later exported to the Advanced
Design System (ADS) environment, where the orange colored traces act as the routing
lines and the citron colored ones as the probe. Minimum feature traces are preferred to
prevent the insertion of malicious circuitry by playing with the width of the traces.
The magnetic and electric fields’ distributions of the routing lines and probes of Fig.
4.1 (b) are shown in Fig. 4.7. The routing lines were excited by a voltage source of onevolt amplitude with a source impedance of 50 ohms. As shown in Fig. 4.7, the main
portion of both magnetic and electric fields find their way into the designed probes. The
maximum magnetic field intensity is about 0.24 A/µm while most of the fields vary
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(a)

(b)
Figure 4.7. (a) Magnetic flux density and (b) Electric field distribution of the design shown in Fig. 4.1 (b).

between 0.08 and 0.16 A/µm. The maximum electric field exceeds 80 V/µm, but most of
the field lines stay within 20 to 65 V/µm. Such electric and magnetic fields can readily be
detected by an on-chip probe to get the signature of the device.
The spice models of both the original and manipulated magnetic probe structures
along with the routing lines were extracted to ADS from the designs created in HFSS,
which are shown in Fig. 4.8 (a) and (b). The extracted lumped models are shown in Fig.
4.9, from where it is evident that both the original and the manipulated design have
similar extracted circuit model, with a slight change in the parameters. The models are
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(a)

(a)

(a)

(a)

(a)

(a)
(b)
(a)
Figure 4.8. Circuit with the design of the magnetic probe:
(a) Original design, and (b) manipulated design
with a portion of the probe removed.
(a)

then exported to the ADS environment to identify the effect of manipulation. Initially, the
simulations were performed using the model(a)of the original design of the probe. An input
was applied to the circuit to capture the signature. The magnetic fields created by the
(a)

routing wires are picked up by the probe. The output of the probe is then fed to the
(a)

inverted input of an OPAMP with the following specification:
(a)

Single Supply: 1 V
Power: 10 mW

(a)
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R=1e-05
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R=1e-05
Rp11
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Rp21
R=4.7005 GOhm

Cp1
C=1.975 fF

Cp2
C=4.423 fF

(a)
Lm
L=2.0509 nH

P1

R1
R=164.116

P2

Rp12
R=1e-05

Rp22
R=1e-05
Rp11
R=228.018 MOhm

Rp21
R=5.0115 GOhm

Cp1
C=1.957 fF

Cp2
C=4.419 fF

(b)
Figure 4.9. Lumped models of the coupling between the routing traces and (a) the original magnetic probe,
and (b) the manipulated magnetic probe.

Routing Paths

Magnetic
MagneticProbe
Probe

Amp

Signature

Figure 4.10. Equivalent circuit model of the magnetic probe.
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Figure 4.11. Output voltage (a) without probe (b) with probe; (c) difference between a and b; and (d) The
unique signature.

Gain: 60 dB at 100MHz
Noise Figure: 1.2 dB at 100 MHz
As different routing lines are at different voltage levels, the fields captured by the
probe are also different at different locations. The induced signature varies depending on
the placement and orientation of the probe. To observe this effect, one terminal of the
magnetic probe from the extracted model was grounded while the other was connected to
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the amplifier, as shown in Fig. 4.10. After the probes and routing lines designed in HFSS
are exported to ADS, transient simulation of the complete DAC circuit is performed for
both designs without probe and with probe. The effect of adding the probe to the original
design is shown in Fig. 4.11 along with the obtained signature. Fig. 4.11 (a) shows the
digital output of the original circuit without the probe, whereas Fig. 4.11 (b) shows the
same output with the probe added to the circuit. The difference between the first and
second waveforms is shown in Fig 4.11 (c), with a maximum error range of 550 nV,
while the shape of the digital output remains unchanged. This indicates that the effect of
the insertion of the magnetic probes on the performance of the circuit is very negligible.
The unique signature obtained from the circuit is shown in Fig. 4.11 (d). Even though it is
obtained by using a random input to the main circuit, the signature is reproducible as the
same signature will be generated for that exact input. This signature will change if either
the placement of the probe is altered, or a portion of it is removed. To verify this
statement, a portion of the probe design with an area of 12 μm2, shown in Fig. 4.8 (b),
was removed. The effect of the manipulation is observed in ADS environment by passing
the same input signal through the DAC using the extracted spice model of both the
original and the manipulated design. The results are shown in Fig. 4.12, where Fig. 4.12
(a) indicates the signature of the original circuit and 4.12 (b) shows the signature of the
manipulated design. The difference between the two waveforms is shown in Fig. 4.12 (c),
which varies within the range of ±0.6 V. The change in the voltage level is much higher
than the noise voltage, which ensures a proper detection of any malicious activity. This
manipulation also displays a detectable change in the S-Parameters of the probe, which
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Output Showing Change in Signature Due to Probe Manipulation
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Figure 4.12. Graph showing the signature of the (a) Original design and (b) Manipulated design of Fig. 4.8.
(c) Difference between (a) and (b).
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Figure 4.13. S-Parameters of the circuit with (a) original magnetic probe, and (b) manipulated magnetic
probe.
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500

Monte Carlo Simulation

(a)

(b)
Figure 4.14. Monte Carlo analysis over 500 iterations for ±5% variation of width and length of the probes.
TABLE 4.1. VARIATION BETWEEN THE S21 OF THE ORIGINAL AND THE MANIPULATED
DESIGN AT 500 MHZ
Freq (MHz)
125.0
250.0
375.0
500.0
625.0
750.0
875.0
1000

S21 (dB) of the Original Design
-8.417
-8.423
-8.428
-8.432
-8.437
-8.442
-8.447
-8.453

S21 (dB) of the Manipulated Design
-8.825
-8.831
-8.836
-8.84
-8.846
-8.852
-8.858
-8.865

are shown in Fig. 4.13. Resonant frequency of the original probe was 65.9 GHz and
changed to 78.8 GHz for the manipulated probe.
The frequency domain Simulations were also conducted at 500 MHz to show the
correlation between the results in the time domain and the frequency domain. The results
in Table 4.1 indicates that S21, which corresponds with the gain in time domain, decreases
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4.15. Final IC routing including the design of the magnetic probe: (a) the output of the initial design
connected to the bottom layer of the final routing using TSV (b) original design of the final IC routing, and
(c) a portion of metal is removed from, (d) an extra die has been added.

by about -0.4 dB when the circuit is manipulated. The simulation results in the time
domain in Fig. 4.12 (a) and Fig. 4.12 (b) also indicate that the gain drops slightly for the
manipulated circuit.
Monte Carlo simulation of the DAC circuit was also performed to check the effect of
process variation. The parameters of the magnetic probe were varied by ±5% over a
simulation of 500 iterations. The output of the simulation is shown in Fig. 4.14. Fig. 4.14
(a) shows the output of the original circuit, which indicates that it remains unchanged
regardless of any variation of the probe. As shown in Fig. 4.14 (b), the DC offset of the
signature varies by as much as 125 mV, but the frequency content and hence the shape of
the signature remains unchanged; whereas any change in the model of the probe varies
both of those.
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Figure 4.16. S-Parameters of the routing of the IC of Fig. 4.15 with (a) original magnetic probe, (b)
magnetic probe with a portion of metal removed, and (c) magnetic probe with extra die added.
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Figure 4.17. Graph showing the signature of the (a) Original design and (b) Manipulated design of Fig.
4.15 (b, c). and (c) Difference between those two signatures.
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TABLE 4.2. COMPARISON WITH THE STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS
Method
Paper
[36]
Paper
[37]
Paper
[38]
Paper
[39]
Proposed

%
Filled

Dependency on
the IC Size

93%99%
99%100%

Does not work well
for bigger ICs
Cannot fill 100% in
complex circuits
Dependent, but not
reported
Independent of IC
size
Independent of IC
size

>90%
100%
Poly
100%

Maximum Size
of Main Circuit

Hardware Trojan
Distinguishability

Signature
Obtained by
Using

Not reported

Hard

Bit-Sequence

80% of the die

Hard

Bit-Sequence

85% of the die

Hard

Bit-Sequence

Independent

Comparatively Easier

Independent

Comparatively Easier

Delay
Measurement
Analog Voltage
Profile

The circuit simulated previously is connected via a TSV to another design. The
location of the TSV is shown in Fig. 4.15 (a). The final IC routing is shown in Fig. 4.15
(b). To mimic the manipulation by an attacker, 12 μm2 area was removed from the probe
metals as indicated in Fig. 4.15 (c). Part of the removed metal is under the top layer,
which is expected with both 2.5D and 3D ICs. During the die stacking and TSV bonding
process of 3D IC, a separate die with the Trojan circuit can also be added to the original
design, which is shown in Fig. 4.15 (d). The resulting S-parameters, shown in Fig. 4.16,
exhibit a considerable

a shift in S21: from 82.6 GHz for the original circuit of Fig. 4.15

(b) to 85.8 GHz for the IC of Fig. 4.15 (c) and to 87.8 GHz for the IC of Fig. 4.15 (d).
The spice models were then extracted from the HFSS model and the transient simulations
of the complete circuit were performed in the ADS environment to see the variation of
the signature. Figure 4.17 shows the signatures obtained from the circuits in Fig. 4.15 (b)
and (c), and difference between their signatures. The difference between the two
signatures varies between -100 mV and 400 mV as shown in Fig. 4.17 (c). Similarly, Fig.
4.18 (a) and (b) shows the signature obtained from original probe and probe with a Trojan
added by placing an extra die during the bonding stage, and Fig. 4.18 (c) shows the
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Change in Signature due to inserted Malicious Die
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Figure 4.18. Graph showing the signature of the (a) Original design and (b) Manipulated design of Fig.
4.15 (b, d). and (c) Difference between those two signatures.

difference between their signatures, which has a range of ±400 mV. The variation in both
cases is large enough to be readily detected by the implemented magnetic probe.
Table 4.2 show the comparison between the performance parameters of the existing
methods and those of the proposed solution. As shown in the table, [36] cannot reach
100% filled space, but both [37] and [38] can do so, given the original circuit occupies a
maximum of 80% (for [37]) or 85% (for [38]) of the whole die. The technique of
108

Effect of Process, Voltage and Temperature (PVT) Variations
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Figure 4.19. Graph showing change in signatures due to (a) Process, (b) Voltage and (c) Temperature
variations.

manuscript [39] is independent of the size of both the design and the IC and creates a
unique signature, which is sensitive to the PVT variations. Thus, a relatively complex
readout circuit traces with minimum width and gap are used in this method. Moreover,
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the signatures in the reported works are digital while in the proposed method, the
signature is an analog one, which is more difficult to duplicate.
The effect of PVT variations on the obtained signature was also observed to verify the
robustness of the proposed method. For each simulation, the parameter was varied by a
maximum of ±10% from the nominal value. As seen in Fig. 4.19, amplitude of the
signature varies marginally due to PVT variations: the amplitude varies linearly with the
process and voltage variations, whereas it varies inversely with temperature. Each
variation is large enough to be detected. The change in the amplitude caused by PVT
variations affect the DC offset.

4.5

CONCLUSION

In this paper, a method to prevent untrusted foundry from inserting malicious circuits
or Hardware Trojans is presented. In the proposed solution, the excess layout resources,
which include metal and polysilicon layers, are used to design on-chip magnetic probes.
As a result, the attacker will not have routing resources to implement a Hardware Trojan
and connect it to the main circuit. Moreover, the magnetic probes are used to capture the
unique signature of the IC, which can be used to verify Trojan-free chips. A layout-filling
ratio of 100% can be obtained using the proposed technique. The proposed method can
also be used to detect Trojans in 3D ICs during die stacking or TSV bonding stages.
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Chapter 5
HARDWARE
TROJAN
PREVENTION
USING MEMRISTOR
HARDWARE
TROJAN
PREVENTION
USING
TECHNOLOGY
MEMRISTOR TECHNOLOGY
5.1

INTRODUCTION

Advances in deep submicron semiconductor technologies have enabled an
unprecedented level of integration of complex and high-performance analog and digital
circuits, processing units, Micro-Electro-Mechanical-Systems (MEMS), input/output
interfaces, memories, and sensors into a single Integrated Circuit (IC). A state-of-the-art
fabrication node would cost design companies billions of dollars [1]. To decrease the
capital costs and mitigate the final cost escalation, outsourcing strategies have been long
adopted by design houses as a practical alternative. However, from a security point of
view, the trend toward outsourcing is not flawless. The migration of in-house fabrication
to overseas foundries could provide opportunities for malicious activities and pave the
way for potential security threats such as Hardware Trojans and IP theft [2].
In its broad sense, Hardware Trojan (HT) can be defined as any malicious
modification of a circuit to alter its characteristics that may lead to failure in normal
functionality, leakage of confidential information, shortage of the expected lifetime,
denial of service under certain conditions or, in general, any undesirable effect on ICs [3].
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Figure 5.1. A typical design flow of IC manufacturing process.

The threat of HTs has drawn more attention after the discovery of counterfeit chips
destined for safety and security-critical systems such as high-speed train breaks, hostile
radar tracking in F-16 fighters, ballistic missile defense control systems, and Falcon
5000 nuclear identification tool during recent years [4]. These alarming security concerns
about the vulnerability of ICs to HTs have brought about preventive measures such as
the Trust in ICs program initiated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) [5] or the European funded Holistic Approaches for Integrity of ICT
(Information and Communication Technologies)-Systems (HINT) project [6] to address
these new challenges. Researchers have also started treating hardware security as an
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integral part of chip design [7]. They proposed to design the security measures in such a
way that their performance can be evaluated and be optimized if necessary.
Trojan insertion can be done in any stage of an IC development process from RTL
design to fabrication. Figure 5.1 illustrates a typical design flow of IC manufacturing
process. The potential threat in each step is also shown in the figure. Assuming trusted
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) tools, third party intellectual property (IP) cores, and
untampered design files, in what follows our main focus will be on tackling Trojans
embedded in the physical design after tapeout and during fabrication, which is a direct
consequence of outsourcing.
A set of security measures against HTs, known as Trojan prevention techniques, has
recently gained great attention. Trojan prevention relies mainly on the fact that Trojan
insertion without having prior knowledge about the functional behavior of the original
design is very challenging as Trojans either will not be triggered or be easily detected.
Based on this idea, Chakraborty et al. presented a novel technique to obfuscate the
original behavior of the design by expanding the reachable state space of the original
design. In this method, an extremely rare condition must happen for a transition from the
obfuscated mode to the normal mode [8], [9]. The basic idea is to confine the circuit to an
isolated (obfuscated) state-space unless a unique input sequence is applied that allows the
transition from obfuscated to normal mode. Since the starting state of the circuit
operation is located inside the isolated state space, the signal probabilities computed by
the adversary through applying random inputs would highly differ from the true
quantities resulting from an operation of the circuit in the normal mode.
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Malik et al. have developed an obfuscated standard cell library in which all the cells
have identical masking layers and only differ in dopant polarity of the active area [10].
Although this technique provides a high level of obscurity against visual inspection for
reverse engineering, the functionality of the original design remains unchanged, and low
probability nodes are still exposed. Moreover, a similar structure for all the standard gates
would cause negative effects on delay, area, and power consumption.
Split manufacturing is another way to provide a high level of obfuscation in the
functional behavior of the chip. In this method, the bottommost layers of a chip including
the substrate and transistor layers together with a few layers of metal wiring would be
made in the first foundry (with the possibility of malicious activities). This stage must be
done at a state-of-the-art fabrication foundry as these layers contain the most finely
detailed features of the chip. Then the wafer would be shipped to one or two trusted
foundries so that the higher less detailed layers of the chip can be fabricated. Note that
the latter stage could be done in a less advanced foundry as fabricating the higher layers
requires less advanced technology and can be carried out in-house.
Based on the idea of split manufacturing, Mitra et al. have devised a randomized
parity checker circuitry integrated into the original chip that constantly monitors ongoing
processes [11]. The transistor and first metal layers were built in the Global Foundries fab
in Singapore. The next four metal layers were added at an IBM-built plant in Burlington,
VT, and finally to obfuscate the function of the checker circuitry some of its connections
were made later by adding a layer of resistive RAM-based switches. This method
presents a promising solution however, the cost overhead of several sub-manufacturing
and shipping would not be justifiable for all applications.
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Another method is presented by Fournaris et al. where they used reconfigurable-logic
barriers as a prevention technique against Hardware Trojans and IP Piracy [12]. Here,
they divided the whole circuit into different subcircuits, the flow of signal among which
depends upon a security key. The desired flow of information is possible only by
providing the correct key. This is a very efficient method; the main drawbacks being the
added area and power overhead associated with the logic gates used for the security key.
In all the above-mentioned methods, robustness against Trojans insertion is achieved
at the cost of additional logic cells embedded into the original design. This hardware
overhead could have a negative effect on the performance of the original circuit in terms
of power consumption, critical path delay, or required die area. They can also mask the
effect of the insertion of a Trojan [13]. Recent studies [14]–[16] have shown the
vulnerability of typical split-manufacturing and obfuscation techniques against Boolean
satisfiability (SAT) solver attacks, which eliminates incorrect connection combinations
while recovering missing back-end-of-line signals. As a countermeasure, researchers
have come up with different techniques in [17]–[21] to increase the difficulty of
executing a SAT attack. The primary assumption of a SAT attack is that the attacker has
access to an activated IC, where the IC performs its normal operation and correct inputoutput pairs are generated. Moreover, the attacker must know the gate level logical
representation of the circuit. If both the assumptions are satisfied, the attacker can use the
SAT attack to obtain the applied key bits.
Inspired by the idea of obfuscation and recent advances in memristive devices, in this
paper, we present a novel Trojan and IP piracy prevention technique using a hybrid
architecture of nanowire crossbars and CMOS technology to conceal the functional
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behavior of the circuit. We show that the proposed technique can be applied to any type
of design with a low area and power overhead. Broadly speaking, the idea presented here
runs in the same vein as the one presented in [12]; the main idea being obfuscating the
actual netlist of the design. The one presented here has some added advantages compared
to the one in [12]. The implementation of the obscuring method presented here is much
simpler than the one presented in [12]; the new method being as simple as rerouting a net
through 2 conductors, and just a memristor. Moreover, the use of memristor devices as
opposed to the CMOS gates used in [12] ensures lower power and area overhead [22]. A
new design flow and test method based on the proposed hybrid architecture has also been
presented in this article. The proposed method is resilient against SAT-based attacks
since even if the attacker gets a pre-activated IC, it is very unlikely to have the netlist of
the original design. The crossbar structure ensures that a single net can be connected to an
array of other nets, based on the biasing values. The most feasible way to know the actual
netlist is to know the biasing values beforehand, which in this case is the applied key bits.
Hence, the proposed method can thwart a SAT attack efficiently.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II provides a brief introduction of
a generic Hardware Trojan, explains the concept of design obfuscation, and briefly
introduces Memristor devices. The proposed architecture, that prevents both Hardware
Trojan insertion and IP piracy, the proposed design flow, and the test method are
presented in Section III. The simulation results and comparisons are provided in Section
IV. Finally, in Section V concluding remarks are drawn.
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Figure 5.2. Generic Hardware Trojan.

5.2
A

PRELIMINARIES
Generic Hardware Trojan

The operation of a generic hardware Trojan is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. A Trojan
constantly listens to the variations in the values of a group of carefully selected internal
nodes known as triggering nodes (indicated by N1 to Nn in Fig. 5.2). To camouflage a
Trojan as much as possible, despite the nature of the Trojan’s functional behavior, the
triggering nodes should be essentially selected from a set of nodes whose combination of
desired values creates a rare condition known as triggering event.
The structure of a Trojan can be composed of a combinatorial circuit reacting to
specific triggering events. It could also contain several sequential elements forming a
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finite state machine, in which a sequence of transitions must be traversed before
triggering a malfunction. Finally, after the triggering conditions are satisfied, Trojans
would affect one or several nodes referred to as the payload. Having an overall picture of
how a hardware Trojan operates, in what follows the concept of design obfuscation is
explained first and then the proposed scheme is presented in Section III.
B

The Basic Idea Behind Design Obfuscation
Trojan activation is a very popular detection technique due to two reasons: First, it is

highly reliable against process variations and measurement noises. Second, the process
can be integrated into the Logic Test stage of the post-manufacturing and verification
phase (Fig. 5.1).
From the standpoint of a well-designed Trojan detector, an appropriate set of input test
vectors would be the one that can trigger the low probability events i.e. the set of nodes
whose values rarely change during the normal operation of the IC, which makes them a
potential choice for generating triggering conditions. However, it is extremely hard to
scan the whole state space and cover all the inter-state transitions of the design through
randomly generated test vectors.
On the other hand, from an adversary point of view, any tampering in the functional
behavior of the original design should be concealed in a way that is very difficult to
detect with conventional logic test methods. In other words, the adversary would make
certain that the Trojan is only triggered under very rare conditions at the internal nodes,
which are unlikely to arise during the test phase but can occur during long hours of field
operation.
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To find the set of low probability events, a good approach for an adversary would be
to simulate the conditions under which the IC would be used in normal operation mode.
This can be done by randomly bringing the circuit to one of the states, available in the
reachable state space, and then feeding the circuit with random input vectors. This way, a
good approximation of node signal probabilities can be acquired. Then, nodes with the
smallest signal probabilities would be selected from the pool of internal nodes as
potential candidates.
One effective approach to prevent an intelligent adversary from discovering rare
conditions is to obfuscate the true functionality of the circuit. In general, design
obfuscation is a technique whose main objective is to hide the functionality and structure
of the original design by transforming it into a secondary functionally equivalent design
that is significantly more difficult to comprehend compared to the original one.
C

Memristive Devices
The current trend towards downscaling transistor dimensions in semiconductor

technology is reaching its limits. Over the past few years, it has become more and more
evident that other strategies should be employed to enable us to keep pace with
performance improvement. Postulated first by Leon Chua in 1971 [23] as the fourth
fundamental circuit element, memristors (contraction of memory resistors) introduce
further integration capacity to conventional IC technology.
In general, a memristive device is a two-terminal electrical element that acts like a
resistive switch whose resistance is dependent on the magnitude, duration, and polarity of
the voltage applied to it. Memristive devices are known for the non-volatile alteration of
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Figure 5.3. Crossing nanowires are separated by memristor switches at the junctions that can be electrically
configured. Nanowire crossbars are connected to a CMOS chip via metallic pins over the CMOS stack.

their resistance, in the sense that they are capable of retaining a state of the most recent
internal resistance based on the history of the applied voltage or the amount of charge
that passed through them. The most notable feature of memristors is their current-voltage
hysteresis curve, originally called pinched-hysteresis loops, that demonstrates their
nonlinear behavior. This hysteretic current-voltage characteristic is caused by the
inherent dependency of their resistance (or conductance) on the history of the voltage
applied to them.
127

TABLE 5.1. CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN 3 DIFFERENT MEMRISTOR DEVICES FABRICATED
AT UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, HP LABS AND ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
Memristor

Ron (Ω)

Roff (Ω)

Vt (V)

[31]
[32]
[33]

125K
100
500K

125G
10K
1G

4.0
0.7
0.6

Switching time
(ns)
10
2
50

Advantage
low energy intake
low switching time
low write voltage

Apart from non-volatile random access memories which would be the most obvious
application of memristors stemming from their hysteretic switching behavior, the high
scalability, low power dissipation, short dynamic response, and more importantly
nonlinear behavior of memristive devices make them appealing for a wide range of
applications such as reconfigurable switches in FPGA-like ICs, material implication logic
gates and synaptic connections for a neuromorphic network just to name a few [24]–[26].
One of the popular structures used for the fabrication of memristors is the crossbar
architecture [27]. The crossbar structure is composed of two layers each consisting of an
array of parallel nanowire electrodes as shown in Fig. 5.3. These two layers together form
a grid of orthogonal nanowires. In a memristor-based crossbar structure, a cross-point
junction is formed by a memristor switch connecting the top layer to the bottom layer
where two nanowires cross over each other. Fabrication of hybrid CMOS/memristorbased crossbar architectures reported in [27]–[29] proves the feasibility of the memristor
technology combined with the existing CMOS technology. Table 1 presents the
characteristics of three memristor switches [30] fabricated in different labs at the
University of Michigan [31], HP labs [32], and Arizona State University [33].
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5.3

PROPOSED TROJAN AND IP PIRACY PREVENTION TECHNIQUE

The proposed scheme that is explained in the rest of this section differs from the
previously proposed schemes in that:
1.

No limitation is imposed on the type of standard cell libraries used to synthesize
the RTL description and no modification is made on the set of standard cells.

2.

Obfuscation is achieved by hiding the functionality of the circuit using a layer of
configurable switches that blurs the actual netlist of the circuit at the time of
outsourcing.

3.

Netlist obfuscation is carried out without adding extra logic elements and as a
result the delay and power overheads are kept minimal.

4.

A configurable routing layer can be fabricated in the same foundry as the rest of
the IC is fabricated, which in turn averts the cost overhead of split
manufacturing.

The secure netlist clustering combined with obfuscation improves the testability, fault
coverage and Trojan detection if any Trojan could be inserted.
A

Proposed Netlist Obfuscation Scheme
The proposed scheme takes advantage of memristor switches to add a level of

configurability to the signal routing in Nano/CMOS hybrid architectures. New advances
in the fabrication of memristors have enabled an additional level of configurability in
routing layers stemming from integrating a layer of nanowire crossbar over the CMOS
stack using nanoimprint lithography technology [27], [28], and [34]. The basic idea
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behind the proposed scheme is to obfuscate the functional behavior of the circuit by
selecting a specific number of connected net pairs from the netlist and rerouting them
across a configurable grid of nanowire crossbars. This can be done by connecting one of
the nets of each pair to a source contact and the other net to a drain contact along the two
metallic pin rails connecting the crossbar to the CMOS stack as shown in Fig. 5.3. The
memristors of Fig. 5.3 connect each horizontal line to all the vertical lines. In the final
design, which vertical line will connect to the horizontal line depends on the voltage
applied to the memristors through the vias, as the resistance of all the memristors depend
on the applied voltage. This resistance can be expressed as:
𝑀(𝑥) = [𝑅𝑂𝑁 𝑥 + 𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐹 (1 − 𝑥)]

(1)

where, RON and ROFF are the resistances of the memristor during the ON and OFF states
respectively, and x is the state variable, which is represented by the ratio between the
thickness of the doped region, w and the width of the thin film, D as:

𝑥=

𝑤
𝐷

(2)

If 𝑤 = 𝐷, the doped region covers the full width of the thin film, and the memristor(2)
is
in ON state and vice versa.
(2)
Other types of switches such as Flash, e-fuse, and anti-fuse can also be used to form a
(2)
programmable routing layer. However, the configuration of these switches requires
higher voltage compared to memristor switches which result in higher power
(2)
consumption during configuration. Also, configuration time is larger than the one for
memristor switches. Moreover, these switches are larger than memristor switches.
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(2)

(2)

(2)

Figure 5.4. Example of original and obfuscated STG. Uncertain interconnections between selected nodes
obscure the original STG and hide the rare events.

The effect of replacing several routing tracks with a layer of nanowires and
configurable switches can be further explained by an example shown in Fig. 5.4. The
figure symbolically illustrates the State Transition Graph (STG) of a circuit before and
after netlist obfuscation. The part of the graph depicted in black belongs to the original
circuit with completely routed interconnections. Assume that a set of connected nets are
carefully selected from the netlist and for each pair of connected nets the permanent
routing interconnecting wires are replaced with a pair of crossing nanowires and a
reconfigurable memristor switch at the intersection of the nanowires. The crossbar
structure of the nanowires allows the possibility of forming arbitrary connection between
any source and drain net pairs.
The switches are programmed later at the design house to form the remaining required
connections of the routing interconnect. As a result, the full routing map of the IC is not
exposed to the foundry with the possibility of malicious activities at the time of
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fabrication. Without having prior knowledge about the final ON/OFF state of the
memristor switches it is extremely hard to extract either the correct netlist or the original
STG of the circuit. Furthermore, any random guess about the correct configuration of the
switches by an adversary may result in a different STG which is partially different from
that of the correctly routed circuit. This may include removing several correct states,
adding several states not reachable in the original STG, and adding/removing some of the
transitions between states that can be detected in the test phase.
Figure 5.4 also shows an example of possible STG changes caused by an incorrect
configuration setting of the switches. As shown in Fig. 5.4, two states along with their
respective state transitions which originally belonged to the unreachable state space are
now added to the set of reachable states. Moreover, states S0 and S2 are removed from the
set of reachable states. Also, any changes in the netlist of the circuit may result in never
satisfying one or several transition conditions as in the case with the state transition from
S1 to S3.
As discussed earlier, an intelligent adversary would typically be interested in finding
rare triggering events. One of the most important outcomes of the circuit’s functional
obscurity is the ability to hide rare events. Getting confined in the modified STG would
result in node probability estimations that significantly deviate from that of the original
circuit. Similarly, changes in the functional behavior of the circuit caused by netlist
obfuscation would mislead the adversary in finding fewer observable nodes in an attempt
to use as payloads. Another direct result stemming from an alteration of the reachable
state set is that those potential Trojans whose malicious functionality depends on the
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temporarily reachable states will not be activated after a correct configuration of the
switches as those states are not reachable in the correct operating mode of the circuit.
To increase the probability of hiding rare conditions, candidate nets should be selected
in a way that strongly affects the signal probability of poorly controllable/ accessible
nodes in the circuit. Intuitively, the more pairs of candidate nets are selected from the
synthesized netlist the higher level of obfuscation can be achieved. While the task of
replacing all routing tracks with a single grid of crossing nanowires might be formidable
due to density limitations, a more realistic opportunity lies in selecting those
interconnections that have the most radical effects on the rare conditions, namely less
controllable/accessible nodes. Those nodes can be connected using network clustering to
deprive the attackers of the knowledge of the most vulnerable nets. Another key factor
that needs to be considered during selecting these nets is testability. The sub-circuits have
to be designed in such a way that they can later be tested separately.
a) Netlist Clustering

The most vulnerable nets can be connected using this method to ensure that an
attacker does not know the key netlists to execute an attack. Furthermore, the circuit can
be divided into different blocks or clusters as in [35] where each block can then be
secured separately. The objective of clustering the circuit’s netlist into sub-circuits is
threefold. First, only the routing tracks between clusters are selected to be configurable
because it is not feasible to make all the routing tracks programmable as mentioned
earlier. Second, instead of testing the whole circuit, each cluster is tested separately
which improves the test quality. Third, detection of hardware Trojans inserted in subcircuits requires much less effort compared with detection of those inserted in the original
133

circuit with billions of gates. It is true that even after netlist clustering, the number of
gates in a single sub-circuit may be numerous but the sub-circuit becomes easier to test
due to the ease of access to its circuitry.
Conventional circuit partitioning techniques in VLSI design only optimize the design
constraints including area, delay, and power consumption which can reveal information
and undermine the security of the circuit. Partitioning methods have been proposed in the
literature [36], [37] that consider security metrics while incurring cost overheads. Secure
partitioning methods choose nets to hide them from an untrusted foundry. The goal of
these methods is to provide the required level of security with minimal performance
degradation and cost overhead. Partitioning techniques have also been proposed to
facilitate hardware Trojan detection [38]–[40] or obfuscate the circuit to complicate
hardware Trojan insertion [41].
a) Proposed Clustering Method: To apply the proposed hardware Trojan prevention
technique on a circuit, first the circuit netlist at the gate level is clustered into groups of
smaller netlists. Then, the layout of each cluster is designed. Finally, clusters are
connected through the reconfigurable memristive switches. The designers/test engineers
are the only people that know the correct configurations of the switches.
Since the objective is to hide the rare events, the proposed clustering technique at first
finds the nets with low switching probabilities or low observability/controllability. In the
second step, the circuit netlist is clustered so that the connections between the clusters are
composed of the nets found at the first step.
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Figure 5.5. The grids of crossing nanowires that are configured by memristive switches using ‘Via’ pins.
Shift registers are used as boundary scan registers for testing the clusters.

The proposed clustering method prioritizes security over hardware optimization. The
clustering method finds the minimum speed, area, and power consumption requirements
and does not optimize these constraints further since security constraints are more
important. Therefore, the secure clustering technique prevents proximity attacks. Two
more constraints listed below are also considered by the proposed clustering technique:
1.

The cut-size is bounded by the number of reconfigurable routing switches.
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2.

The number of input and output signals for each cluster is bounded by the
maximum number of boundary scan cells defined for testing clusters. The
boundary scan cells are routed by reconfigurable memristor switches to the
cluster under test.

b) Testability

The proposed architecture is tested cluster by cluster. The test mechanism for a cluster
(sub-circuit) is provided by boundary scan registers as shown in Fig. 5.5, which illustrates
the grids of crossing nanowires that are configured by memristive switches using ‘Via’
pins. One cluster at a time can be tested through boundary scan registers. Inputs and
outputs of the cluster under test are connected to the input and output boundary registers
by proper configuration of the memristor switches.
Testing the circuit through its sub-circuits facilitates the testing process. Intermediate
signals of the whole circuit become the primary inputs/outputs of a sub-circuit which are
accessible by boundary registers during the test phase. This improves the
controllability/observability of the signals inside the circuit. Higher fault coverage can be
achieved with a smaller number of test vectors for each sub-circuit. As sub-circuits are
connected by the nanowire crossbar structure, testing the connection between them can
be performed by testing the memristor crossbar architecture.
B

Proposed Design Flow Based on the Hardware Trojan Prevention Method
For utilizing the proposed Hardware Trojan prevention technique in the digital design

process, the standard design flow requires some modifications. Figure 5.6 illustrates the
proposed design flow. Blocks with red dashed line border present changes applied to the
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Figure 5.6. The proposed design flow based on the presented Hardware Trojan and IP piracy prevention
technique.

standard design flow. The clustering operation accepts the circuit’s netlist, and design
and security constraints defined by the designer and generates n clusters of gate-level
netlists. The number of clusters (n) is determined based on the security level and design
constraints.
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Figure 5.7. (a) Block diagram of ISCAS ’85 C432 Circuit (b) The netlist is divided into five clusters.
Connections between clusters are realized with memristor switches through nanocrossbar structure.
Memristor switches in the ON state and OFF state are presented by blue and white circles, respectively.

The netlists are placed and routed separately, and their layouts are generated which are
presented as GSDII files in Fig. 5.6. The “Placement and Routing” tool also creates the
routing tracks from the input/output pins of the generated layouts to the nano-crossbar
structure and a configuration file. GDSII files and the file containing routing track layers
between layouts and the nano-crossbar switches are shipped to the factory for chip
fabrication. The configuration file is only accessible by in-house designers and it is used
to configure the programmable routing layers before the final deployment of the chip.
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C

Implementation of Proposed Hardware Trojan Prevention Technique in ISCAS
’85 Benchmark Circuit, C432
The proposed hardware Trojan prevention method was implemented in ISCAS ’85

Benchmark Circuit, C432, a 27-channel interrupt controller. The interrupt controller’s
block diagram is shown in Fig. 5.7 (a). The netlist is divided into 5 clusters (M1-M5).
The complete structure of the interrupt controller, after rerouting using the memristive
crossbar structure, is shown in Fig. 5.7 (b). The connections among clusters are realized
by a nano-crossbar architecture with memristor switches. The switches are presented with
circles and blue circles show that the vertical and the horizontal wires are connected. As
shown in Fig. 5.7, outputs of clusters and primary inputs are connected to horizontal
nanowires while inputs of clusters and primary outputs are connected to the vertical ones.
D

Security Analysis of the Proposed Technique
To analyse the security of the proposed technique, let us assume that the attacker is in

an untrusted foundry that fabricates the circuit, and they do not know the function of the
circuit. The attacker’s goal is to find the correct configuration of the reprogrammable
routing layer to connect the sub-circuits correctly and thus gain the knowledge needed to
insert a stealthy trojan. Following are some clues that can help the attacker to achieve the
goal:
1. Memristor switches and the crossbar structure of the switches guide the attacker
to the possibility of programmable routing.
2. Using the crossbar structure, the attacker can apply high or low voltages to the
“Vias” as shown in Fig. 5.5 to configure the switches. For a crossbar of n

139

switches, there exist a total of 2n possible configurations. The number of
switches should be large enough to ensure the required level of security.
The use of a memristor switch can add some extra layer of obfuscation to the circuit.
The extent of the doped region and hence the resistance of the memristor depends on the
voltage applied to the via. So, some of the resistors needed in the original circuit can be
replaced by memristors of the crossbar and those vias can be biased to a certain voltage to
reflect that resistance. That way, unmasking the original purpose of the device becomes
more challenging as the vias can have any number of voltage levels between 0 and 1
resulting in much more than 2n possible configurations. It also reduces the power
requirement of the original circuit as memristors consume much less area and power
compared to its CMOS counterpart [42]. The concept can be supported mathematically.
The change of the state variable can be depicted as:
𝑑𝑥
𝜇𝑣 𝑅𝑂𝑁
=
𝑖(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
𝐷2
where μv is the electron mobility. Thus, the state variable, x(t) can be rewritten as:

𝑥(𝑡) = 𝜇𝑣

𝑅𝑂𝑁
𝑞(𝑡)
𝐷2

(3)

(3)

(3)
(4)

(3)
(4)

and equation (1) becomes:
2
𝑅𝑂𝑁
𝑅𝑂𝑁
𝑀(𝑥) = [𝜇𝑣 2 𝑞(𝑡) + 𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐹 (1 − 𝜇𝑣 2 𝑞(𝑡))]
𝐷
𝐷

For the memristors used as switches, 𝑅𝑂𝑁 ≪ 𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐹
can be calculated from:

(3)
(4)
(5)

(3)
(4)
(5)
and the resistance of the memristor
(3)
(4)
(5)
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(3)
(4)
(5)

𝑀(𝑥) = 𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐹 (1 − 𝜇𝑣

𝑅𝑂𝑁
𝑞(𝑡))
𝐷2

(6)

(6)
As evident from equation 6, the resistance of the memristor varies based on the
charge, and hence, the voltage supplied to the via, which can be considered for replacing
(6)
the resistors of the original circuit.
(6)
5.4

SIMULATION RESULTS AND COMPARISON

(6)
The effect of clustering on the cost overhead and security is emphasized by the netlist
of the 27-channel interrupt controller with five clusters in Fig. 5.7 (b). The 9-bit data
(6)
streams are shown as a bus bar in the figure. Clustering can improve security since it
(6)
conceals the correct connections among sub-circuits. The fact that the wrong
combinations generate some form of output makes it very difficult to obtain the actual
(6)
functionality of the circuit without having any idea about the proper netlist. In the worst
(6)
case, an adversary should try all possible routes among clusters to find the correct
configuration. The phenomenon can be described by estimating the total number of
(6)
possible connections among sub-circuits for a less complicated scenario, where each
output of one cluster can only be connected to one input of another cluster or itself. Let(6)
n
be the number of sub-circuits and mi and oi denote the number of inputs and outputs of
(6)
each cluster, respectively. The total number of possible configurations is (∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑚𝑖 )! =
(∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑜𝑖 )!. For example, for a circuit divided into ten sub-circuits with five inputs and
(6)
five outputs each, the total number of configurations is 50!. The larger the possible
(6)
configurations, the more difficult it is for the adversary to find the correct configuration.
The circuit of Fig. 5.7 (b) contains 4900 (70×70) reconfigurable switches. The security(6)
of
the circuit can be further enhanced by increasing the number of programmable switches
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(6)

(6)

or by increasing the number of clusters, which can be realized by dividing the circuit of
each cluster into multiple smaller clusters. Besides, clustering the circuit into smaller subcircuits improves the detection of inserted hardware Trojans and facilitates the test
process. On the other hand, each switch increases the power and delay overhead. So, a
balance needs to be maintained between the security and the overhead. To observe the
effect of a memristor switch on the routing path of a circuit, a spice model was developed
following the model proposed by Chang et al [43]. The memristor equations are defined
as [43]:
𝐼(𝑡) = (1 − 𝑥(𝑡))𝛼[1 − 𝑒 −𝛽𝑉(𝑡) ] + 𝑥(𝑡)𝛾 sinh(𝛿𝑉(𝑡))

(7)

𝑑𝑥
= 𝛾[𝑒 𝜂1𝑉(𝑡) − 𝑒 −𝜂2𝑉(𝑡) ]
𝑑𝑡

(8)

(8)
where equation 7 is the I-V relation representing the Schottky barrier between the oxide
layer and the bottom electrode by the first term, and the tunnelling through the MIM
(8)
junction by the second term. The ion migration and hence the conductivity of the device
is determined by the state variable x(t), which has a value within the range of 0 and(8)
1.
The parameters α, β, γ, δ, η1, and η2 are all determined by material properties such as the
(8)
barrier height for Schottky barrier and tunnelling, the depletion width in the Schottky
barrier region, the effective tunnelling distance in the conducting region, and interface
(8)
effects.
(8)
The parameters were considered carefully to obtain a low resistance in the ON mode
(8)
and relatively high resistance in the OFF mode so that the device can be used as a switch.
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(8)

(8)

Figure 5.8. Modified LTspice code for memristor inspired by the model proposed by Chang et al. in [37].

The resulting spice model is shown in Fig. 5.8. The constants in the equations were
defined as follows: α = 5×10−7, β =0.5, γ = 5×10−6, δ = 2, λ = 5, η1 = 0.062, η2 = 4, and τ =
10. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.9. Figure 5.9 (a) shows the I-V curve with
respect to time, where the prominent curvature in the current waveform is due to the
hyperbolic sinusoidal term in the I-V relationship of equation 7. As a result of this
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Voltage
Current

Voltage (V)

Current (µA)

Current (µA)

ON

OFF

OFF

ON

Voltage (V)

Time (s)

(a)

(b)

3.91 MΩ

9.11 μW

Power (μW)

Resistance (MΩ)

9.15 μW

976 Ω

Voltage (V)

Voltage (V)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.9. Simulation results for the memristor using a Spice model inspired by the model proposed by
Chang et al [39]: (a) The variation of current due to the change of voltage (b) The pinched hysteresis loop
created by the current as a function of voltage (c) Change of the resistance due to the change in voltage (d)
Variation of power consumption due to the variation of voltage.

curvature, the resistance during the OFF state becomes very large, somewhere in the
megaohm range. The pinched hysteresis loop of Fig. 5.9 (b) shows almost zero current in
the OFF state due to the high resistance in that state as shown in Fig. 5.9 (c). The
resistance of the ON state is considerably low. The resistance versus voltage waveform of
Fig. 5.9 (c) signifies that the value of the resistance is a function of both the applied
voltage and the previous state. These unique characteristics of a memristor can be
manipulated to replace different resistances of the original design as was discussed before
with the help of equation 6. The maximum power consumed by a memristor is around 9
µW, which is shown in Fig. 5.9 (d). Clustering not only improves the circuit security but
can also be used as an effective test-access-mechanism to the internal nodes of the
circuit-under-test. With direct access to the clusters through the memristor crossbar, the
observability and controllability of the circuit under test increases significantly. As a
result, it is much easier to detect a HT at the test phase if it is inserted in a cluster, as less
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TABLE 5.2. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED METHOD WITH SPLIT MANUFACTURING
TECHNIQUES OF CIRCUIT432 IN TERMS OF OVERHEAD
Techniques

Delay Ratio

Power Ratio

[33]
[42]
Proposed

2.14
1.48
1.13

1.92
1.97
1.89

TABLE 5.3. DESIGN OVERHEAD OF THE PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
Circuit432

Delay

Power Consumption

Without Memristor Switches
With Memristor Switches

1.7
1.915

1.77E-04
3.36E-04

effort is required to activate Trojans in smaller sub-circuits than in the main circuit.
Moreover, the proposed technique is resistant to proximity attack [44] as the gates and
their connections are clustered randomly without considering spatial proximity.
Many split manufacturing techniques have been proposed in the literature to prevent
hardware Trojan insertion. Authors in [36] proposed a split manufacturing technique that
utilizes 3D IC technology. Some wires are lifted to a top layer and fabricated on a trusted
foundry. In [45], an obfuscated Built-in self-authentication (BISA) method, which is a
combination of split-manufacturing and BISA techniques, has been proposed that
protects ICs from both IP theft and hardware Trojan insertion. Both techniques used the
C432 circuit to find the overhead required by the corresponding method. Using the same
benchmark, the method proposed here yields less power and delay compared to the other
two techniques. The comparison is shown in Table 2. The effect of adding the memristor
crossbar architecture to the design overhead is also observed and is shown in Table 3,
both delay and power consumption increase negligibly due to the insertion of this
architecture.
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5.5

CONCLUSION

Untrusted design tools and fabrication facilities expose ICs to different types of
attacks. Hardware Trojans are among the most important threats to the security of
integrated circuits. In this paper, a new approach is proposed that prevents Hardware
Trojan insertion and IP piracy during the IC fabrication process. This technique can be
applied to any circuit without affecting the area or power consumption significantly. In
the proposed method, the circuit is divided into sub-circuits which are connected to a
network of memristor switches. As a result, the routing between the sub-circuits is
obfuscated. The proposed method does not require split manufacturing and the entire
circuit can be fabricated by one foundry, provided that it is capable of incorporating
memristor devices into the CMOS IC, which can reduce the overall costs. The proposed
clustering scheme can also be used as a test-access-mechanism to apply test vectors to the
sub-circuits and observe their responses. Such direct access to the internal sub-circuit
increases the testability considerably and assists the detection of possible Trojans inserted
in the sub-circuits.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Hardware Trojan analysis and countermeasures have gained considerable interest in
recent years due to the increased vulnerability of hardware security. Many companies are
adopting the fabless fly-light model. A hardware Trojan is commonly designed to serve a
specific purpose under a particular condition that makes its detection a difficult task. A
comprehensive solution to detect all types of hardware Trojan is far from reach. A more
practical approach is a design for hardware tests and security methods to prevent Trojan
insertion in the first place. Among the many solutions in the literature, layout filling and
layout manipulation are considered promising techniques to prevent Trojan insertion. In
this work, two different layout filling methods together with a layout manipulation
solution are presented.
In the first layout filling approach, the unused polysilicon layer is filled with
microstrip inductive probes of minimum feature size to deny attackers accessing the
active layer to insert a Trojan. As the polysilicon layer connects directly to the active
layer, the only way to insert a Trojan is by removing a portion of the polysilicon layer.
This removal will change the original circuit's signature and can be detected by an
embedded readout circuit. Simulation results show that removing the polysilicon layer to
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insert even a single library can affect the device signature. The results of Monte Carlo
simulations indicate the solution robustness against deviations of circuit parameters.
In the second approach, a layout filling method is presented in which the unused die
area is covered by on-chip magnetic probes using minimum feature polysilicon and metal
wires. The advantage of this method is the ability to detect routing manipulations. This
method can occupy the entire unused layers and can provide a 100% occupation ratio.
The proposed method shows a strong performance even for 3D ICs and can be used to
detect Trojans in 3D ICs during die stacking or TSV bonding stages.
For future work, the probes' design in the presented layout filling methods can be
optimized for power, area, and speed to improve the performance. Manual filling of the
unused chip areas will be time-consuming for large circuits. An auto-routing software
tool can be developed to automatically modify the original routing to ensure protection
against Trojan injection while optimizing the routing for power consumption and speed.
The third approach is a type of layout manipulation where the original circuit is
divided into sub-circuits connected through a network of memristor switches. In this
method, the routings between sub-circuits are obfuscated. As such, the fabrication
foundry will not have access to the complete netlist and functionality of the final circuit.
Another advantage of this method over conventional obfuscation methods is the support
for fabrication in one foundry regardless of the trust level and without the need to split
manufacturing, which can reduce the fabrication costs. This method can facilitate the
testing process as direct access to sub-circuits is provided. Such direct access to the
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internal circuits increases the testability considerably and helps detect Trojans in subcircuits.
The unique properties of memristors can be used to replace some resistors in the main
circuit to mask its functionality. For future work, a combination of crossbars and resistors
swapped with memristors can be utilized to obfuscate circuits and protect them against
unauthorized alteration. An attacker has to find a voltage between the on and off state
biasing voltages to successfully wage an attack. The search for correct biasing becomes
quite challenging if several resistors in the main circuit are replaced with memristors.

156

APPENDICES
Appendix A – LIST

OF PAPERS DURING

PH.D.

THAT ARE NOT RELATED TO THE

DISSERTATION TOPIC

Title of the Publication
T. M. Supon, I. I. Basith, E. Abdel-Raheem and R. Rashidzadeh,
“Efficient integrated bus coding scheme for low-power I/O,” AEU International Journal of Electronics and Communications, vol. 82, pp.
30-36, December, 2017.
T. M. Supon and R. Rashidzadeh, “A phase locking test solution for
MEMS devices,” 2017 22nd IEEE European Test Symposium (ETS),
Limassol, 2017, pp. 1-6.
R. Rashidzadeh, E. Jedari, T. M. Supon and V. Mashkovtsev, “A
DLL-based test solution for through silicon via (TSV) in 3D-stacked
ICs,” 2015 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC), Anaheim, CA,
2015, pp. 1-9.
I. I. Basith, T. M. Supon, E. Abdel-Raheem and R. Rashidzadeh,
“Comparative study on bus-coding schemes and improvement on SINV
coding,” 2016 28th International Conference on Microelectronics
(ICM), Giza, 2016, pp. 17-20.
H. Rashidzadeh, P. S. Kasargod, T. M. Supon, R. Rashidzadeh and M.
Ahmadi, “Energy harvesting for IoT sensors utilizing MEMS
technology,” 2016 IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and
Computer Engineering (CCECE), Vancouver, BC, 2016, pp. 1-4.
M. Alamgir, I. I. Basith, T. Supon and R. Rashidzadeh, “Improved
bus-shift coding for low-power I/O,” 2015 IEEE Int. Symposium on
Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Lisbon, 2015, pp. 2940-2943.
157

Publication
Type
Journal
Article
Conference
Paper
Conference
Paper

Conference
Paper

Conference
Paper
Conference
Paper

Appendix B – PERMISSION TO REUSE CONTENT

RightsLink

Home

Help

Email Support

Sign in

Create Account

Hardware Trojan Prevention Through Limiting Access to the Active
Region
Conference Proceedings:
2019 14th International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In
Nanoscale Era (DTIS)
Author: Tareq Muhammad Supon
Publisher: IEEE
Date: April 2019
Copyright © 2019, IEEE

Thesis / Dissertation Reuse
The IEEE does not require individuals working on a thesis to obtain a formal reuse license, however, you may
print out this statement to be used as a permission grant:

Requirements to be followed when using any portion (e.g., figure, graph, table, or textual material) of an IEEE
copyrighted paper in a thesis:
1) In the case of textual material (e.g., using short quotes or referring to the work within these papers) users must
give full credit to the original source (author, paper, publication) followed by the IEEE copyright line © 2011 IEEE.
2) In the case of illustrations or tabular material, we require that the copyright line © [Year of original publication]
IEEE appear prominently with each reprinted figure and/or table.
3) If a substantial portion of the original paper is to be used, and if you are not the senior author, also obtain the
senior author's approval.

Requirements to be followed when using an entire IEEE copyrighted paper in a thesis:
1) The following IEEE copyright/ credit notice should be placed prominently in the references: © [year of original
publication] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [author names, paper title, IEEE publication title, and month/year
of publication]
2) Only the accepted version of an IEEE copyrighted paper can be used when posting the paper or your thesis online.
3) In placing the thesis on the author's university website, please display the following message in a prominent place
on the website: In reference to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this thesis, the IEEE does
not endorse any of [university/educational entity's name goes here]'s products or services. Internal or personal use
of this material is permitted. If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising or
promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go to
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/rights_link.html to learn how to obtain a License
from RightsLink.
If applicable, University Microfilms and/or ProQuest Library, or the Archives of Canada may supply single copies of
the dissertation.
BACK

CLOSE WINDOW

© 2020 Copyright - All Rights Reserved | Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. | Privacy statement | Terms and Conditions
Comments? We would like to hear from you. E-mail us at customercare@copyright.com

158

RightsLink

Home

Help

Email Support

Sign in

Create Account

On-Chip Magnetic Probes for Hardware Trojan Prevention and
Detection
Author: Tareq Muhammad Supon
Publication: Electromagnetic Compatibility, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher: IEEE
Date: Dec 31, 1969
Copyright © 1969, IEEE

Thesis / Dissertation Reuse
The IEEE does not require individuals working on a thesis to obtain a formal reuse license, however, you may
print out this statement to be used as a permission grant:

Requirements to be followed when using any portion (e.g., figure, graph, table, or textual material) of an IEEE
copyrighted paper in a thesis:
1) In the case of textual material (e.g., using short quotes or referring to the work within these papers) users must
give full credit to the original source (author, paper, publication) followed by the IEEE copyright line © 2011 IEEE.
2) In the case of illustrations or tabular material, we require that the copyright line © [Year of original publication]
IEEE appear prominently with each reprinted figure and/or table.
3) If a substantial portion of the original paper is to be used, and if you are not the sen ior author, also obtain the
senior author's approval.

Requirements to be followed when using an entire IEEE copyrighted paper in a thesis:
1) The following IEEE copyright/ credit notice should be placed prominently in the references: © [year of original
publication] IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from [author names, paper title, IEEE publication title, and month/year
of publication]
2) Only the accepted version of an IEEE copyrighted paper can be used when posting the paper or your thesis online.
3) In placing the thesis on the author's university website, please display the following message in a prominent place
on the website: In reference to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this thesis, the IEEE does
not endorse any of [university/educational entity's name goes here]'s products or services. Internal or personal use
of this material is permitted. If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for advertising or
promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution, please go to
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/rights_link.html to learn how to obtain a License
from RightsLink.
If applicable, University Microfilms and/or ProQuest Library, or the Archives of Canada may supply single copies of
the dissertation.
BACK

CLOSE WINDOW

© 2020 Copyright - All Rights Reserved | Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. | Privacy statement | Terms and Conditions
Comments? We would like to hear from you. E-mail us at customercare@copyright.com

159

VITA AUCTORIS

NAME:

Tareq Muhammad Supon

PLACE OF

Barisal, Bangladesh

BIRTH:

YEAR OF BIRTH:

1984

EDUCATION:

B.Sc. in Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Ahsanullah University of Science and Technology, Dhaka,
Bangladesh, 2007
M.Eng. in Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada, 2010
MASc in Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada, 2012
Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada, 2021

160

TAREQ MUHAMMAD SUPON
WORK EXPERIENCE
Research Assistant

•

University of Windsor
Windsor, ON, Canada
Jan 2014 – Current

•

Graduate Assistant

•

University of Windsor
Windsor, ON, Canada
Jan 2014 – Current

•
•

Apprenticeship

•

LandauGage
Windsor, ON, Canada
Nov 2015 – Feb 2016

•

Research Associate

•

University of Windsor
Windsor, ON, Canada
Sep 2012 – Dec 2013

•
•
•

Conducting research on different types of hardware
security concerns and solutions
Developing new techniques for hardware testing and
authentication
Attend scheduled labs and assist the corresponding
instructor with in-class activities
Evaluate assignments, lab reports, and exams
Assist with different queries of the students during the
weekly office hours
Design a laser assembly system to extract various features
of a V-Groove pulley
Compare the measurement results with the existing data to
confirm the validity of the results obtained from the laser
system
Designing a 77 GHz radar module using LTCC (Low
Temperature Co-fired Ceramic) for automotive collision
avoidance system.
Collaborating with CMC (Canadian Microelectronics
Corporation) and IMST (Institute of Mobile and Satellite
Communication Techniques) to fabricate the device.
Designing a test setup to test the fabricated device and
carry out the testing at ARFSL (Advanced RF Systems
Lab) at the University of Manitoba.
Performing literature reviews, organizing reference
materials and preparing a test report.

•

Doing research on different types of analog/digital testing
devices

Graduate Assistant

•

University of Windsor
Windsor, ON, Canada
Sep 2010 – Apr 2012

•
•

Attend scheduled labs and assist the corresponding
instructor with in-class activities
Evaluate assignments, lab reports, and exams
Assist with different queries of the students during the
weekly office hours

Research Assistant
University of Windsor
Windsor, ON, Canada
Sep 2010 – Apr 2012

161

Executive Engineer
Powermann Bangladesh
Limited
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Jan 2009 – Jun 2009

Lecturer
Ahsanullah University of
Science and Technology
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Nov 2007 – Dec 2008

•
•
•
•
•

Selling and installing transformers, generators, MDB/SDB
box, ATS, etc.
Helping the customer with decommissioning of the
transformer.
Delivering lectures on different courses including
Electrical Circuits-I, Electronics-I, etc.
Conduct the lab sessions of corresponding courses and
evaluate the students
Hold examinations and evaluate the students based on
their performance

EDUCATION
Ph.D. in Electrical
Engineering

University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada
Electrical and Computer Engineering

(Dec 2020)

MASc in Electrical
Engineering
(Apr 2012)

M.Eng. in Electrical
Engineering

University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada
Electrical and Computer Engineering
Thesis: A PLL based built-in self-test for MEMS sensors
University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada
Electrical and Computer Engineering

(Sep 2010)

B.Sc. in Electrical
Engineering
(Nov 2007)

Ahsanullah University of Science and Technology
(AUST), Dhaka, Bangladesh
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
MEMS Readout and
Testing

I have designed a readout and test circuitry using PLL
technology for MEMS devices which reduces the effects
of PVT variations. The paper was shortlisted as one of the
top eight articles among more than two hundred papers for
the best paper award.

Fabrication and
testing of two ICs

During my Ph.D. and master’s programs, I have
successfully fabricated two different ICs using two
different technologies (TSMC 180nm and 65nm). I have
also tested both of those to make sure of their proper
functioning.

Long-Range Radar
Package Design using
LTCC

I have designed the packaging of long-range millimeterwave radar using LTCC (Low Temperature Co-fired
Ceramic) process using ADS. This allowed the whole
device to be housed within a 30×30×0.8 package while
reducing the power loss.
162

TECHNICAL SKILLS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Design microelectronic circuits to perform IC security, authentication, and testing
Design RF / Analog circuits and VLSI / Mixed-Signal systems
MEMS DIB design using LTCC (Low Temperature Co-fired Ceramics)
Nano-electronic circuit design
Ability to understand and interpret any schematic diagram and reconstruct those
in a circuit board with skillful soldering
Nano-electronic circuit design
Ability to understand and interpret any schematic diagram and reconstruct those
in a circuit board with skillful soldering

INDUSTRY CAD TOOLS & PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cadence – Microelectronic circuit design and fabrication
Advanced Design System (ADS) – Microelectronic circuit design
COMSOL Multiphysics – 3D design of new transistor technologies
High Frequency Structure Simulator (HFSS) – Design of any 3D structure
IntelliSuite software – Total MEMS solutions
SIMON – Nano-electronic circuit design
LT-Spice – Simulation of any circuit netlist
AutoCAD – Mechanical design
MATLAB & Simulink – Mathematical modeling of any design
LabView – Systems engineering software for test, measurement, and control
Machine Vision Software by National Instruments – Analyzing and interpreting
images captured in a computer
Assembly and C languages

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
•
•
•

Entrance Scholarship – University of Windsor (2010 – 2012)
Dean’s List of Honor – Ahsanullah University of Science and Technology (2007)
Merit Scholarship – Ahsanullah University of Science and Technology (2003 –
2007)

LEADERSHIP & PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
•
•

Secretary and Treasurer, Joint chapter of Circuits and Systems (CAS) &
Computer Society (CS), IEEE University of Windsor, Canada (April 2015 –
March 2018)
Vice President (University Affairs), Graduate Student Society, University of
Windsor, Canada (April 2014 – March 2015)

163

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Vice President (Academic Affairs), Graduate Student Society, University of
Windsor, Canada (April 2011 – March 2012)
Cofounder of IEEE AUST Student Branch
IEEE active Member since 2005
Reviewer of papers at the following conferences:
ISCAS 2020, MWSCAS 2017
Member, Quantum Foundation, Bangladesh, (September 2003 – June 2009)
Student Representative in Senate, Academic Appeals Committee, University of
Windsor, 2014-2015.
Student Representative in Senate, APC committeee, PDC committeee, University
of Windsor, 2011-2012.

EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
•
•
•

A lifetime donor at the Quantum Foundation (Blood Donor Club), Bangladesh.
A player of both the cricket and the football team of Ahsanullah University of
Science and Technology, Bangladesh from January 2004 – November 2007.
Cofounder of Ahsanullah University of Science and Technology (AUST) Science
Club.

PUBLICATIONS
Journal Papers
• T. M. Supon and R. Rashidzadeh, “On-Chip Magnetic Probes for Hardware
Trojan Prevention and Detection,” in IEEE Trans. on Electromagnetic
Compatibility, doi: 10.1109/TEMC.2020.3003728.
• T. M. Supon, M. Seyedbarhagh and R. Rashidzadeh, “A Method to Prevent
Hardware Trojans Limiting Access to Layout Resources,” in Microelectronics
Reliability. Review Requested.
• T. M. Supon and R. Rashidzadeh, “Hardware Trojan Prevention using Memristor
Technology,” Microprocessors and Microsystems, Submitted.
• T. M. Supon, I. I. Basith, E. Abdel-Raheem and R. Rashidzadeh, “Efficient
integrated bus coding scheme for low-power I/O,” AEU - International Journal of
Electronics and Communications,
• T. M. Supon, K. Thangarajah, R. Rashidzadeh and M. Ahmadi, “A READOUT
SOLUTION FOR MEMS SENSORS,” Journal of Circuits, Systems, and
Computers, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 1240014, 2012.
Conference Proceedings
• T. M. Supon, M. Seyedbarhagh, R. Rashidzadeh and R. Muscedere, “Hardware
Trojan Prevention Through Limiting Access to the Active Region,” 2019 14th
International Conference on Design & Technology of Integrated Systems In
Nanoscale Era (DTIS), Mykonos, Greece, 2019, pp. 1-6.
164

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

T. M. Supon and R. Rashidzadeh, “A phase locking test solution for MEMS
devices,” 2017 22nd IEEE Euro. Test Symposium (ETS), Limassol, 2017, pp. 1-6.
I. I. Basith, T. M. Supon, E. Abdel-Raheem and R. Rashidzadeh, “Comparative
study on bus-coding schemes and improvement on SINV coding,” 2016 28th
International Conference on Microelectronics (ICM), Giza, 2016, pp. 17-20.
H. Rashidzadeh, P. S. Kasargod, T. M. Supon, R. Rashidzadeh and M. Ahmadi,
“Energy harvesting for IoT sensors utilizing MEMS technology,” 2016 IEEE
Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE),
Vancouver, BC, 2016, pp. 1-4.
M. Alamgir, I. I. Basith, T. Supon and R. Rashidzadeh, “Improved bus-shift
coding for low-power I/O,” 2015 IEEE Int. Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(ISCAS), Lisbon, 2015, pp. 2940-2943.
R. Rashidzadeh, E. Jedari, T. M. Supon and V. Mashkovtsev, “A DLL-based test
solution for through silicon via (TSV) in 3D-stacked ICs,” 2015 IEEE
International Test Conference (ITC), Anaheim, CA, 2015, pp. 1-9.
T. M. Supon, K. Thangarajah, R. Rashidzadeh and M. Ahmadi, “A PLL based
readout and built-in self-test for MEMS sensors,” 2011 IEEE 54th International
Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), Seoul, 2011, pp. 1-4.
I. I. Basith, T. M. Supon, A. Muhury, R. Rashidzadeh and M. Ahmadi,
“Performance enhancement of single electron junction 1-bit full adder,” 2011
18th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits, and Systems,
Beirut, 2011, pp. 157-160.

165

